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STATUTE
A MODEL STATE ACT: REMEDIES FOR
DOMESTIC ABUSE
LISA G. LERMAN*
The problem of domestic violence has been the subject of increasing
national concern. In response to that concern, states have enacted legis-
lation providing protection to victims of domestic violence, encouraging
improved police enforcement of protection law's, and constructing appro-
priate legal sanctions against abusers. Drafting comprehensive legislation
to address this problem is difficult because both civil and criminal remedies
are needed, because the needs of battered women are diverse and com-
plex, and because effective protection requires a coordinated response by
courts, law enforcement agencies, mental health personnel, and the bar.
While some new legislation on wife abuse has been enacted in a majority
of states, few states have addressed the fill range of available remedies,
or made relief available to all victims of domestic violence.
In this Article, Ms. Lerman presents a Model Act that consolidates and
addresses remedies needed for domestic violence in one comprehensive
statute. Ms. Lerman asserts that the primary goal of any lai' on domestic
violence should be to protect the victim. Accordingly, the Model Act
facilitates the victim's ability to gain access to the courts and to request
protection. The Model Act also acknowledges the needfor improved police
response to domestic violence and specifies particular police duties. In
addition, the Model Act recognizes that domestic violence may be handled
as a civil matter, as a criminal matter, or both. Finally, the Model Act
considers the appropriate legal treatment of abusers and ihchudes both
punitive and rehabilitative dispositional options.
During the last decade, forty-nine states and the District of
Columbia have enacted new legislation to provide legal remedies
* Advocacy Fellow, Center for Applied Legal Studies, Georgetown University Law
Center. B.A., Barnard College, Columbia University, 1976; J.D., New York University,
1979. From 1979 to 1981 Ms. Lerman was Staff Attorney of the Family Violence Project
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Clinical Fellow at the Women's Rights Clinic of Antioch School of Law. This article
was initiated as part of the curriculum of the Women's Rights Clinic.
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to victims of domestic violence.' Most of the legislation confers
broad injunctive powers on the courts to provide emergency
I For a comprehensive analysis of all state statutory provisions providing remedies
to victims of domestic abuse, consult Lerman & Livingston, State Legislation on
Domestic Violence, RESPONSE, Sept.-Oct. 1983, at 1. This article is available from the
Center for Women Policy Studies, 2000 P St., N.W., Suite 508, Washington, D.C. 20036.
The following provisions are representative of recent enactments. ALA. CODE §§ 30-
5-1 to -I I (Supp. 1982) (protection order); ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.35.10-.060 (1983) (pro-
tection order, police intervention); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3601 to -3602 (Supp.
1982-1983) (protection order, police intervention, criminal law); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-
1653 to -1659 (Supp. 1981) (criminal law); CAL. CIv. CODE § 4359 (West 1983) (protection
order); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 545-553 (West Supp. 1983); COLO REV. STAT. §§ 14-
4-101 to -105 (1973 & Supp. 1982) (protection order), amended by Act of Apr. 29, 1983,
ch, 175, 1983 Colo. Sess. Laws 640.; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38 (West Supp.
1982) (protection order); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 901(9), 902, 921(6), 925(15), 950(5)
(1974 & Supp. 1982) (protection order); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1001 to -1006 (1981 &
Supp. 1983); (protection order, criminal law); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West Supp.
1983) (protection order); GA. CODE §§ 19-13-1 to -5 (1982 & Supp. 1983) (protection
order); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 586 (Supp. 1982), amended by H.B. 1102, 12th Leg. (1983)
(protection order); IDAHO CODE § 19-603 (1947 & Supp. 1982) (police intervention);
Illinois Domestic Violence Act §§ 101-103, 201-213, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 2301-
1 to -3, 2302-1 to -13 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982) (protection order), amended by Act of
Aug. 18, 1983, Pub. Act No. 83-101, 1983 Ill. Legis. Serv. 1102 (West); IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-4-5.1 to -6 (West Supp. 1982-1983) (protection order); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 236-1 to -8 (West Supp. 1982-1983) (protection order); KAN. CIv. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 60-3101 to -3111 (Vernon Supp. 1982) (protection order), amended by Act of May 6,
1983, ch. 201, § 1, 1983 Kan. Sess. Laws 1127; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 209.010-.140,
403.710 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982) (protection order); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:2131-2139 (Vest 1982) (protection order), amended by Act of July 24, 1983, Act
No. 195, § 1, 1983 La. Sess. Law Serv. 875 (West), and Acts of July 2, 1983, Acts No.
406, 407, 1983 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1400, 1401 (West).; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
§§ 761-770 (1981 & Supp. 1982) (protection order); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 4-404, 4-501 to -506 (Supp. 1982) (protection order); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
208, § 34C, ch. 209A, §§ 1-6 (Vest Supp. 1982-1983) (protection order); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 764.15(a)-(b), 769.4a, 772.13, 772.14a (West 1982) (police intervention,
criminal law); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (1982) (protection order, police intervention),
amended by Act of Apr. 22, 1983, ch. 52, § 1, 1983 Minn Sess. Law Serv. 205 (West);
MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 93-21-1 to -29 (Supp. 1982) (protection order); Mo. REV. STAT.
3H 455.010-.085 (Supp. 1983) (protection order); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-106(3) (1981)
(protection order); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-901 to -903, -924 to -926 (1978) (protection
order); NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.020 (1979) (protection order); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 173-B:1 to -B:I 1 (Supp. 1979) (protection order), amended by Act of June 29, 1983,
ch. 522, 1983 N.H. Laws 777; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:25-1 to -16 (West 1982) (protection
order); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-1-7 (Supp. 1981) (police intervention); N.Y. FAM. CT.
ACT §§ 153-C, 155, 168, 216-a(ii), 812, 813, 817, 818, 821-828, 832-836, 838, 841-847
(McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1976-1982) (protection order), amended by Act of June 21,
1983. ch. 347, 1983 N.Y. Laws 601; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50B-1 to -7 (Supp. 1981)
(protection order); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-07.1-01 to -08 (1981 & Supp. 1983) (protec-
tion order); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1901.18-19, 1909.02 (Page Supp. 1982) (protection
order); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 60-60.6 (West Supp. 1982-1983) (protection order),
atended by Act of June 23, 1983, ch. 290, 1983 Okla. Sess. Laws 888; OR. REV. STAT.
§ 107.700-.720, 133.310, 133.381 (1977 & 1981) (police intervention), amended by S.B.
476, 62nd Leg., 1983 Regular Sess.; 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 10,182-10,190 (Purdon
1977 & Supp. 1982-1983) (protection order); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-15-1 to -7 (Supp.
1983) (protection order); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 25-10-1 to -14 (Supp. 1982)
(protection order); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-1201 to -1215 (Supp. 1982) (protection
order); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.01-.19 (Vernon Supp. 1982) (protection order);
Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 631, 1983 Tex Sess. Law Serv. 4046 (Vernon) (amending TEX.
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protection, 2 and imposes specific duties on law enforcement
officials for protection of battered women and other victims of
domestic violence. 3 Although little research has been conducted
exploring the effectiveness of domestic abuse laws, the collec-
tive experience of advocates for battered women suggests that
both injunctive relief and expanded law enforcement duties are
useful tools in stopping domestic violence.
4
The earlier statutes, such as the 1976 Pennsylvania law5 and
the 1978 Massachusetts law,6 provided the template on which
other laws have been constructed. Legislatures have amended
the laws to correct problems that were not anticipated by the
original drafters. The more complex and detailed character of
recent statutes 7 is attributable, at least in part, to the experience
gained from states that enacted abuse laws during the 1970's.
The goals of the various state laws are similar but the actual
relief available and the procedures stipulated vary significantly.
Some states articulate more clearly and specifically the remedies
provided to a victim of domestic abuse.
This Article explores some of the most effective existing laws
and suggests new approaches to resolve issues not yet addressed
FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.11, adding TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.581, and adding TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.08); Act of May 20, 1983, ch. 878, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
3857 (Vernon) (amending TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 71.01-.06, 71.13); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-6-1 to -6-8 (Supp. 1983) (protection order); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1101-1107
(Supp. 1981) (protection order), amended by Act of Apr. 27, 1982, No. 218, 1982 Vt.
Acts 362; J. Res. of Feb. 28, 1978, Va. Acts 1920 (police intervention); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 10.99.010-.070 (1980 & Supp. 1982) (police intervention); W. VA. CODE
§§ 48-2A-1 to -10 (1980 & Supp. 1982) (protection order); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 767.23,
813.025(2)(a) (West 1981 & Supp. 1982-1983) (protection order); Wvo. STAT. §§ 35-21-
101 to -107 (Supp. 1982) (protection order). Extensive legislation is currently pending
in South Carolina.
2 See supra note 1. See generally Lerman & Livingston, supra note 1, at 6-9 (forty-
four states and the District of Columbia have enacted protection order laws).
3 See, e.g, ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.510-.20 (1981 & Supp. 1982) (police officer must
use all means necessary to prevent further abuse); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 769-
770 (1981 & Supp. 1982-1983) (police officer must stay until the victim is no longer in
danger). See generally Lerman & Livingston, supra note 1, at 4, 10-11 (thirty-nine
states have some new laws on police to wife abuse).
4 See generally L. LERMAN, PROSECUTION OF SPOUSE ABUSE: INNOVATIONS IN CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE RESPONSE (1981); S. SCHECTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE (1982).
Act of Oct. 7, 1976, No. 218, 1976 Pa. Laws 1090 (codified as amended at 35 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 10,182-10,190 (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1982-1983)).
6 Act of July 17, 1978, ch. 447, 1978 Mass. Acts 547 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 208, § 34C, ch. 209A, §§ 1-6, ch. 266, § 120, ch. 276, §§ 28, 42A (West Supp.
1982-1983)).
7 See, e.g, ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.10-.060 (1983); Illinois Domestic Violence Act
§§ 101-501, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 2301-2305-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982), amended
by Act of Aug. 18, 1983, Pub. Act No. 83-101, § 1, 1983 Il. Legis. Serv. 1103 (West);
N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:25-1 (West 1982).
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in any statute. This Model Act is to be used to expand the
options available to drafters; it is not intended to be adopted in
toto by legislatures. The practical or political feasibility of in-
dividual provisions will vary depending on local conditions. The
Model Act focuses on substantive drafting options; it considers
only briefly the political considerations that affect drafting. 8
To develop the Model Act, I collected all of the existing
domestic violence laws. With the assistance of a group of stu-
dents, I examined existing law addressing each subject topic by
topic to identify statutory language that provides maximum re-
lief to victims of domestic violence. I then developed a draft
incorporating some of the language and concepts of existing
law. The draft was distributed to an advisory board of approx-
imately twenty people who have drafted or assisted in imple-
menting domestic violence laws. 9 Their comments were incor-
porated, and further revisions were made. Finally, I wrote
commentary explaining the policy issues relevant to selected
sections of the statute.
The model law does not address all of the legal issues affecting
victims of domestic violence. It covers a constellation of issues
relating to injunctive relief and police protection in the context
of domestic violence. 0 While the remedies created are made
available for child abuse as well as adult abuse, this Article does
I For a more detailed discussion of the politics of lobbying for abuse legislation, see
J. HAMOS, STATE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAWS AND How TO PASS THEM (1980)
9 The Advisory Board included the following: Maggie Arzdorf-Schubbe, Director of
Programs and Services for Battered Women, Minnesota Department of Corrections;
Ann Marie Boylan, Esq.; Sally Buckley, Esq., former Coordinator of the Battered
Women's Project, City Attorney's Office, Seattle, Washington; Chris Butler, Esq.,
Boston, Massachusetts; Marjory D. Fields, Esq., Director of the Family Law Unit,
Brooklyn Legal Services Corp. B, Brooklyn, New York; Major Patricia Halsey, Esq.,
United States Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.; Julie E. Hamos, Esq., Assistant State's
Attorney, Cook County, Illinois; Barbara J. Hart, Esq., Harrisburg, Pennsylvania;
Donna Hildreth, Legal Services of New Jersey, Inc., New Brunswick, New Jersey;
Nancy Loving, Police Executive Research Forum, Washington, D.C.; Catherine G.
Lynch, Director, Advocates for Victims, Miami, Florida; Susan May, former Executive
Director, Council on Battered Women, Atlanta, Georgia; Marilyn G. Miller, Executive
Director, Governor's Commission on Women, Salem, Oregon; Deborah Shaw Rice,
Esq., Portland, Maine; Sherrill L. Rosen, Esq., Bogler & York, Kansas City, Missouri;
Joanne Schulman, Esq., National Center on Women and Family Law, New York, New
York; Marcia Walsh, Esq., Kansas City, Missouri; Laurie Woods, Esq., Executive
Director, National Center on Women and Family Law, New York, New York. While
most members of the Advisory Board had some input into the content of the statute,
and some gave extensive and detailed comments, they have not approved the final
product. Therefore, it should not be assumed that the views expressed in the Article
are those of the Advisory Board.
,0 See generally Lerman & Livingston, supra note 1.
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not consider the social service intervention model, a common
legislative response to child abuse. Similarly, the data collection
provisions of this draft are based on pertinent provisions of the
adult abuse laws, and do not reflect the mandatory reporting
system frequently used in child abuse laws."
Also outside of the scope of the Model Act are recent devel-
opments in shelter funding. However, most states have recently
enacted new laws to fund shelters for battered women. In ap-
proximately twenty states, "shelter" funds are generated
through the imposition of a surcharge on marriage licenses.'
2
Though this Act covers legislative changes in law enforcement
policy and procedure, recent changes in criminal laws on
spousal rape 3 and spousal assault 4 are not considered.
Most of the domestic abuse laws have been enacted largely
as a result of the work of legal services attorneys and staffs of
battered women's shelters. 5 In the present period of budget
reductions for social service agencies, fewer resources are avail-
able for work on legislation. This Model Act was written to
share the expertise of those who provide services to battered
women with others who are in a better position to write legis-
lation but who have less information about what is needed.
" See generally Fraser, A Glance at the Past, A Gaze at the Present, A Glimpse of
the Future: A Critical Analysis of the Development of the Child Abuse Reporting
Statutes, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 641 (1978); Sussman, Reporting Child Abuse: A Review
of the Literature, 8 FAM. L.Q. 245 (1974).
12 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-6-11 (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN § 741.01(2) (West
Supp. 1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 122.060(4) (1981). See generally Lerman & Livingston,
supra note 1, at 12-13.
13 The trend toward abolishing the spousal exemption in the sexual assault laws is
tremendously important because, for the first time, the law has begun to recognize that
sexual assault is a form of aggression and that consent to sex is a meaningful concept,
even in marriage. See generally D. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE (1982). Further infor-
mation on spousal rape is available from the National Center on Women and Family
Law, 799 Broadway, Room 402, New York, New York 10003.
'4 While several states have enacted special spouse assault laws, these are of limited
significance because they duplicate other criminal laws and fail to establish any improved
enforcement procedures. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1653 to -1659 (Bobbs-Merrill
1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.25 (Page 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-105
(1982).
15 From 1979 to 1981, while I was Staff Attorney for the Family Violence Project of
the Center for Women Policy Studies, and since that time, I have received calls and
letters from legal services lawyers and shelter staff who were drafting or lobbying for
domestic abuse laws in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Maine, Missouri, New Jersey,
Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and many other states. I received
only occasional calls from state legislators or private attorneys.
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Section 1.00. SHORT TITLE.
This statute may be cited as the Remedies for Domestic Abuse Act.
COMMENTARY: The title of this statute is similar to the titles of
most state abuse laws and indicates the purpose and scope of
Domestic Abuse
the law. The fundamental purpose of the law is to protect victims
of domestic abuse by providing them with injunctive relief and
police protection.
The term "domestic abuse" is used to refer to any physical
violence that occurs in the context of an intimate relationship.
The terms "wife abuse" and "woman abuse" were rejected as
being too restrictive. The remedies provided by this law also
may be invoked to prevent or reduce physical or sexual abuse
of children, abuse of parents by adult children, and violence in
any ongoing relationship regardless of the sex, sexual preference
or marital status of the participants.
The premise of this Model Act is that violence is caused by
and is the responsibility of the perpetrator; violence is not the
product of a relationship or the result of the interaction of the
individuals. Therefore the term "family violence" was rejected.
Although victims of domestic abuse may engage in behavior
that triggers violence, such as making dinner late, buying the
wrong brand of cigarettes or becoming angry if their mate comes
home late, they are not responsible for the violent acts of their
assailants.
Section 2.00. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
The legislature of this state finds that:
Thousands of persons in this state" are regularly beaten and abused
and some are killed by their spouses, other family members, or sexual
partners; 16
Many pregnant women are subject to repeated beatings;
Children are often physically assaulted or witness violence against one
of their parents and suffer deep and lasting emotional harm from
victimization and from exposure to domestic violence;
Domestic violence is a major health and law enforcement problem in
this state and one that affects people of all racial and ethnic back-
grounds and all socioeconomic classes;
Domestic violence can be deterred, prevented, or reduced by legal
intervention;
Tacit acceptance of domestic violence by courts and law enforcement
agencies has resulted in underenforcement of criminal law when the
offender and victim are intimates even though criminal law does not
distinguish between violence against strangers and friends or men and
women;
16 Forty percent of female homicide victims are killed by family members or boy-
friends. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1979, 10, 11 (1980). In
at least one state, survey results indicated that one in ten women experiences some
form of violence from her husband each year. M. SCHULMAN, A SURVEY OF SPOUSAL
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN KENTUCKY 13 (1979).
1984]
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Victims of domestic violence presently experience substantial difficulty
in gaining access to police or court protection, particularly in obtaining
prompt police and court response to emergencies; 17 and
Battered women and other victims of domestic violence have a right
to be safe in their homes.
This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote the
following purposes:' 8
To assure victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from
abuse that the law can provide; 9
To create a flexible and speedy remedy to discourage violence and
harassment against family members or others with whom the perpe-
trator has continuing contact;
To expand the ability of law enforcement officers to assist victims, to
enforce the law effectively in cases of domestic violence, and to prevent
further incidents of abuse; 20
To develop a greater understanding of the incidence and causes of
domestic violence through data collection;
2'
To facilitate equal enforcement of criminal law by deterring and pun-
ishing violence against family members and others who are personally
involved with the offender; and
To recognize that battering is a crime that will no longer be excused
or tolerated.
22
COMMENTARY: This section states the basic premises of the
Model Act. Several of the more recent abuse laws, notably those
of Illinois, 23 Maine, 24 and New Jersey25 have findings and pur-
poses sections similar to the one included here. A section of
this type can educate legislators who are unaware of the scope
of the problem of domestic abuse. Also, since few states main-
tain any formal legislative history, an explicit "findings and pur-
poses" section can provide guidance as to legislative intent.
In collecting data for a findings section, reference to conser-
,' U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDER THE RULE OF THUMB: BATTERED WOMEN
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1982).
18 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 25-2 (West 1982).
19 Id.
20 Maine law directs law enforcement officers to use "all reasonable means to prevent
further abuse." Suggested options include remaining on the scene as long as the officer
reasonably believes that the physical safety of a victim or possible victim is in danger,
assisting victims to obtain necessary medical treatment, giving the victim notice of her
rights, and, if appropriate, arresting the abuser. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 770(6)
(1981).
21 Id. tit. 19, § 770(1).
22 See Illinois Domestic Violence Act § 102, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 2301-2 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 761 (1964).
21 See Illinois Domestic Violence Act § 102, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 2301-2 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1982)
2' ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 761 (1981).
15 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 25-2 (West 1982).
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vative national sources such as those cited here may be useful;
however, it is more important for drafters to collect whatever
statewide or local data exists on the incidence of domestic abuse
and the need for improved response by the justice system.
Extreme caution should be exercised in the selection of data to
be cited in a bill to ensure that the data are accurate and not
misleading.
Most existing data on the incidence of domestic abuse have
been haphazardly collected and may be easily discredited.
26
Drafters may wish to consult with a social scientist regarding
the validity of the statistics selected. In making findings about
the inadequacy of remedies available to battered women and
other victims of domestic abuse, drafters may wish to refer to
national reports27 and to identify particular problems in their
own states. National reports cover issues that are not geograph-
ically defined; local analysis of the problem is also essential. In
a largely rural state, for example, the appropriate or feasible
law enforcement response may be quite different than in an
urban state. In some states there have been no comprehensive
studies of the incidence of or the response to domestic violence.
Drafters also may examine newspaper or magazine articles or
unpublished reports produced by shelters for battered women
or legal services offices.
The finding that victims of abuse have a right to be safe in
their homes might seem too obvious to mention. However, do-
mestic abuse often causes women to flee their homes, or to stay
as virtual or actual prisoners, too terrified to escape and in
constant danger. The right to be safe in one's home also reflects
the long-established constitutional principle that "a man's home
is his castle. ' 28 This principle has led to important restrictions
26 One example is Lenore Walker's statement that "some observers, including myself,
estimate that as many as fifty per cent of all women will be battering victims at some
point in their lives." L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMEN ix (1979). Among those data
most widely discredited are the studies by Straus, Gelles, and Steinmetz on husband
beating. Some of their research has concluded that husband beating is almost as frequent
as wife beating. See Straus, Wife Beating: Causes, Treatment and Research Needs, in
BATTERED WOMEN: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY 463, 468-70 (1978). These conclusions
are contrary to the experience of service providers and the studies of other sociologists
working on domestic violence. See, e.g., S. SCHECTER, supra note 4, at 214 (1982)
(discussion and critique of Straus data).
27 See, e.g., U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 17.
28 See, e.g., Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("freedom
from intrusion into the home or dwelling is the archetype of the privacy protection
secured by the Fourth Amendment"), cited in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589
(1980).
1984]
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on police entry into the home for purposes of criminal law
enforcement, 29 and has been part of the family law doctrine of
discouraging state interference in domestic matters. 30 The grow-
ing recognition of the state's obligation to protect women and
children from their mates or relatives extends this privacy prin-
ciple to require intervention for reasons similar to those given
for the historic intervention on intervention.
The purposes section suggests that violence in domestic sit-
uations can be stopped by providing police and court assistance
tailored to the needs of the victims. Little research has been
conducted concerning the effectiveness of the abuse laws 31 since
1976, when this package of remedies was first enacted in Penn-
sylvania;32 much remains to be done. In the meantime, thou-
sands of victims of abuse flock to courthouses and call the
police, looking for protection. In Philadelphia, for example, the
Women Against Abuse Legal Center receives approximately
four thousand calls and visits per year from battered women
seeking legal assistance.3 3 In Cleveland, about 15,000 women
called the police to request help in situations classified as do-
mestic disturbances during nine months in 1979. 34 In states that
have enacted protection order laws, victims, attorneys, and law
enforcement officials have observed that some batterers are
affected by the issuance of an order prohibiting abuse. 35 Rather
than waiting for definitive research to be conducted, legislators
in most states have chosen to respond to a long-neglected
problem.
The purpose of this law is to stop violence. The goal is neither
to keep violent families together nor to force a separation be-
29 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
30 The view that the state should keep families together by leaving them alone still
has a tremendous influence on family law in this country. See generally Developments
in the Law--Fanily Law 93 HARV. L. REv. 1157 (1980).
' See infra note 35.
32 Act of Oct. 7, 1976, No. 218, 1976 Pa. Laws 1090 (codified as amended at 35 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 10,182-10,190 (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1982-1983)).
" Interview with Joan Kuriansky, Director, Women Against Abuse, in Philadelphia
(Dec. 15, 1981).
11 Interview with Grace Kilbane, Director of the Cleveland Witness/Victim Assistance
Program, in Cleveland (Jan. 15, 1981).
" To date, no published study has focused on the effectiveness of protection orders.
Several agencies have conducted follow-up interviews with victims of abuse who obtain
protection orders, and have observed a substantial deterrent effect. See, e.g., Unpub-
lished Follow-Up Study on Women Who Obtain Restraining Orders (n.d.) (available
from W.O.M.A.N., Inc, 2940 16th St., San Francisco, CA. 94103). All of the battered
women interviewed by Lenore Walker who had obtained restraining orders found them
useful. L. WALKER, supra note 26, at 212 (1979).
[Vol. 21:61
Domestic Abuse
tween people in violent relationships. The Model Act is designed
to increase the possibility that a person being victimized can
make herself safe, either by removing herself or the abuser from
the situation, or by asking the court system to require that the
violence stop. The primary issue is not whether the relationship
continues but whether the violence stops.
Section 3.00. DEFINITIONS.
As used in this Act:
3.01. Domestic Violence: means the occurrence of any of the following
acts, attempts, or threats against a person who may be protected under
this Act under section 3.02:
(A) Battery: causing physical harm to another with or without a deadly
weapon; 36
(B) Assault: purposely or knowingly placing or attempting to place an-
other in fear of physical harm;
37
(C) Coercion: compelling another by force or threat of force to engage
in conduct from which the latter has a right to abstain or to abstain
from conduct in which the person has a right to engage;
38
(D) Sexual Assault: causing or attempting to cause another to engage
involuntarily in any sexual act by force, threat of force, or duress; 39
(E) Harassment: engaging in a purposeful, knowing, or reckless course
of conduct involving more than one incident that alarms or causes
distress to another person and serves no legitimate purpose. The
course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person
to suffer substantial emotional distress and must actually cause
substantial emotional distress to the petitioner. Such conduct might
include but is not limited to:
(1) following another about in a public place or places;
(2) peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of
another;
but does not include constitutionally protected activity;
4°
36 See W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-2(a)(1) (1980).
37 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1(b) (Supp. 1979).
3' See WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 9A.36.070(1) (1977).
39 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 1 (West Supp. 1982-1983).
40 See CAL. Cxv. PROC. CODE § 527.6(b) (West 1979 and Supp. 1983); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 240.25 (McKinney 1980). The California statute provides the basis for a sub-
stantial portion of the Model Act's definition of harassment. The Act expands the
requisite course of conduct to include recklessness; the California statute requires that
conduct be knowing. The California law also defines a course of conduct as "a series
of acts evidencing a continuity of purpose." The New York law includes "following
another about" in the definition of harassment.
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(F) Unlawful Imprisonment: holding, confining, detaining or abducting
another person against that person's will;
41
(G) Unlawful Entry: entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the
property of another against the wishes of the dweller or owner;
42
(H) Damage to Property: causing damage to the property of another or
to property jointly owned by the perpetrator and another;
43
(I) Theft: taking or attempting to take or appropriate property belong-
ing to another or jointly owned by the perpetrator and another;
44
(J) Other Conduct: any other conduct that could be punished as a crim-
inal act under the laws of this state.
45
COMMENTARY: The definition of domestic violence serves two
functions. The first describes what conduct of the abusive party
will enable a person subjected to domestic violence to obtain a
protection order. Second, the definition is also referred to in the
section on violation of protection orders. That section indicates
that commission of any act listed in the definition of domestic
violence may subject the abuser to criminal penalties.
As to the first function, the definition in the model law makes
it very easy for a victim 46 to get a protection order. Most existing
abuse laws require that the victim show that she has been sub-
jected to physical assault, threats of assault, or attempted as-
sault. 47 Under the model law, other types of criminal conduct
that commonly occur in abusive relationships may provide the
basis for a request for a protection order. For example, under
the model law, if a person is victimized by being imprisoned in
her home for a period of time, she may seek a protection order
even if she suffered no physical abuse.
4' Cf. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.40.040 (1981) (defining unlawful imprisonment as know-
ing restraint of another person).
42 Cf. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.52.010 (1981) (defining unlawful entry as entry by one
not licensed, invited, or privileged to enter or remain).
11 See WOMEN'S LEGAL DEFENSE FUND'S PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-1001 (1981) [hereinafter cited as WLDF AMENDMENTS]. This draft legislation
is available from Women's Legal Defense Fund, 2000 P Street, N.W., Suite 400, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20036.
See WLDF AMENDMENTS, supra note 43, § 16-1001.
' This approach to defining domestic violence is adapted from the laws in Washington
and New Jersey, whose abuse laws cross-reference numerous criminal code sections.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 25-3, (West 1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99.020 (Supp.
1983-1984).
16 Because most victims of domestic violence are female and most abusers are male,
feminine pronouns are used in the commentary to refer to victims of domestic abuse
and masculine pronouns are used to refer to abusers. The Act, however, is gender
neutral; it is designed to protect all persons who are victims of domestic violence,
regardless of gender, age, sexual preference, or relationship to the abuser.47Cf. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1001(5) (Supp. 1983) (definition of intrafamily offense);
OR. REv. STAT. § 107.705(2) (1981) (definition of family or household members).
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The definition of domestic violence is adapted from language
used in state criminal codes. 48 This reflects the fact that one of
the purposes of the statute is to prevent crime. Most of the
conduct which could lead to issuance of a protection order could
be the subject of criminal charges in most states. The simulta-
neous availability of civil and criminal relief is explained in the
section on nonexclusive relief.
The Model Act grants judges tremendous discretion in fash-
ioning appropriate relief. It is contemplated that the extent of
remedies granted in each case will reflect the seriousness of the
danger in each situation. Since a protection order may be limited
to an injunction prohibiting conduct that is already prohibited
by criminal law, there is no reason to restrict the issuance of
orders to circumstances in which serious physical violence has
already occurred.
Section 4.07 of the Model Act, which addresses violation of
protection orders, requires that commission of a listed act be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt before any criminal penalties
may be imposed. To obtain a protection order, however, the
same act need be proven only by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. The effectiveness of the protection order depends in part
on easy filing and proof requirements, so that victims need not
hire attorneys or prepare extensively.
Most abuse laws contain definitions of domestic violence that
are too narrow. 49 This broader definition is intended to cover all
the varieties of cruel and bizarre conduct that are commonly
encountered in battering relationships. 5
Alternative 1
3.02. Victims of Domestic Violence. A victim of domestic violence who
may be protected under this Act shall include any person who has been
subjected to domestic violence (as defined in section 3.01) by a spouse,
former spouse, a parent, a child, or any other person related by blood
or marriage, a present or former household member, a person with
"8 See supra notes 36-45 for specific references.
49 See, e.g., PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 10,182 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983) (defining
abuse to include "the occurrence of one or more of the following acts between family
members or household members who reside together: (i) attempting to cause or inten-
tionally, knowingly or recklessly causing bodily injury or serious bodily injury with a
deadly weapon; (ii) placing by physical menace another in fear of imminent serious
bodily injury; (iii) sexually abusing minor children pursuant to the Child Protective
Services Law"). It fails to include harassment, property destruction, theft, eavesdrop-
ping, or unlawful entry.
50 See generally D. MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES (1976).
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whom the victim has a child in common, or a person who is or has been
in an intimate relationship with the victim.5'
Alternative 2
3.02. Victims of Domestic Violence. A victim of domestic violence who
may be protected under this Act shall include any person who has been
subjected to domestic violence (as defined in section 3.01) by another
person who has or had some ongoing personal relationship with the
victim, regardless of their marital or blood relationship (or lack thereof)
or living arrangements.
COMMENTARY: The remedies created by the law must be made
available to as broad a group of victims as possible. Chronic
violence occurs in many intimate relationships directed toward
spouses, children, parents, lovers, siblings, and others. Often
the violence continues and even escalates after a relationship is
terminated. Patterns of violence may develop in relationships in
which the parties are not and have never been cohabiting. 52
Laws that fail to provide broad coverage might be interpreted
as legislative condonation of violence in the excluded
relationships.
The first alternative, a long specific list of relationships in
which domestic violence occurs, is the more common formula-
tion. The second alternative is admittedly broad, but it attempts
to avoid the possibility that some victims might be deprived of
a remedy because of imprecision in drafting or because of po-
litical compromises made during the drafting process. One risk
of a broad definition is that some attorneys might attempt to use
the law to remedy domestic relations or landlord-tenant prob-
51 Cf. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1001(5) (Supp. 1983) (covering persons related by blood
or marriage, any person with whom the victim has a child in common, a person with
whom the victim shares or within the last year shared residence, and any person with
whom the victim maintains or maintained an intimate relationship); OR. REV. StAr.
§ 107.705(2) (1981) (covering "adult persons related by blood or marriage," or persons
who cohabited within one year of the date of filing the petition).
32 Almost every existing abuse law requires present or former cohabitation with the
abuser for the victim to be eligible for relief. The only exceptions to this requirement
are that in a few states if the abuser and victim are related by blood or marriage, no
present or former coresidency requirement is imposed. See, e.g., supra note 51. See
generally Lerman & Livingston, supra note I, at 6-7, 14 at n.45. States which require
cohabitation may deny relief to a large number of victims. One study of emergency
room records found that 72% of the victims of domestic violence in the sample were
not living with the abuser at the time of the assault. E. STARK, A. FLITCRAFT, D.
ZUCKERMAN, A. GREY, J. ROBESON & W. FRAZIER, WIFE ABUSE IN THE MEDICAL
SETTING (1980) (published by the Office of Domestic Violence of the U.S. Dep't of
Health and Human Services).
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lems in cases where there has been no domestic violence. This
general definition also creates a risk of narrow interpretation by
judges to whom petitions for protection orders are presented.
The definition of a victim of domestic violence frequently has
been the most controversial issue in legislative debate of the
abuse laws. Some conservative legislators, fearful of condoning
cohabitation, object to the enactment of any law that appears
to sanction it. In addition, many legislators do not understand
that violence occurs in all types of relationships and want to
simplify the rights conferred by the law by narrowing the group
of people who might be protected. 53 In any case, a long specific
list of relationships is likely to elicit a debate on this subject.
3.03. A Protection Order is any injunction issued under this Act for
the purpose of preventing acts of domestic violence. The term refers to
both temporary and final orders issued by civil and criminal courts,
whether obtained by filing an independent action or as a pendente lite
order in another proceeding.
54
COMMENTARY: The term "protection order" has been selected
to describe the injunction authorized by the statute because
most abuse laws use this or similar terms to describe the in-
junctions authorized by this section. 55 Other frequently used
terms, including restraining order, protective order, and tem-
porary restraining order, may be confused with other injunctive
remedies available in court.
In some jurisdictions the order is called a civil protection
order.56 The word "civil" is not used in the Act because the
order contemplated could be issued as an independent civil
remedy or as part of another civil or criminal proceeding. In
addition, since some violations of the order may lead to criminal
penalties, the remedy is quasi-criminal. Reference to it as a civil
remedy might be misleading.
" Compare conflicting language on coverage of unmarried victims in TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 36-1201 to -1295 (Supp. 1979). The language at the end of the statute restricting
applicability to spouses was added as an amendment.
'4 See Illinois Domestic Violence Act § 103(3), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 2301-3
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982).
-5 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West Supp. 1983) ("order of protection");
Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 455.010-.085 (Supp 1983) ("order of protection"); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 173-B:1 to -B:l1 (Supp. 1979) ("protective order"); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 1901.18-.19, 1909.02 (Page Supp. 1982) ("protection order"); 35 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 10,182-10,190 (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1982-1983) ("protection order").
36 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1001 to -1006 (1981 & Supp. 1983).
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Section 4.00. PROTECTION ORDERS.
4.01. Jurisdiction.
(A) Courts
(1) All district (circuit, superior, municipal, county, probate, crim-
inal, family, domestic relations, etc.) courts shall have concur-
rent jurisdiction over all proceedings under this chapter.
57
(2) A protection order may be sought:
(a) as an independent civil action, or joined with any other civil
action;
(b) as a part of the preliminary, final, or post-judgment relief
in any civil action; or
(c) during a criminal action at the request of the prosecutor or
the victim as a condition of pretrial release, as a condition
of diversion, or as a condition of probation or parole.
58
COMMENTARY: The purpose of this section is to require all trial-
level state courts that have any power to grant injunctive relief
to hear petitions for protection orders. The section also rejects
classification of domestic violence as solely civil or criminal in
nature and terminates the historic tradition of relegating wife
abuse exclusively to domestic relations courts.
(B) Venue. A petition for a protection order may be filed in any district
where
(1) the petitioner resides,
(2) the respondent resides,
(3) the alleged abuse occurred, or
(4) the victim is temporarily located if she has left her residence to
avoid further abuse.
COMMENTARY: This section gives courts broad discretion to
hear petitions for protection orders, and affords victims of abuse
easy access to the nearest or most convenient court.
(C) Convenience. Convenience of the forum shall be determined by the
preference of the petitioner.
COMMENTARY: This section prohibits transfer of petitions to
other courts on grounds of forum non conveniens. Many victims
7 See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:21 (Supp. 1981).
s See Illinois Domestic Violence Act § 202(a), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 2302-2
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982).
Domestic Abuse
of abuse move away from their abusers in search of safety and
then seek court protection at the new location. This section
prohibits the courts from conditioning protection on a victim's
return to a court near her residence.
(D) Non-Exclusive Relief
(1) The remedies and procedures provided in this Act are in addi-
tion to and not in lieu of any other available civil or criminal
remedies. Petitioners shall not be barred from relief under this
Act because of other pending proceedings or existing
judgments. 9
(2) Relief shall be available under this Act without regard to
whether the petitioner has initiated divorce proceedings or
sought other legal remedies.
(3) As to domestic relations proceedings, if custody or support has
already been adjudicated, the terms of a previous court order
may be incorporated into a protection order. Custody or visit-
ation arrangements specified in an existing order may be mod-
ified in a protection order upon a showing of changed circum-
stances for the purpose of preventing further domestic violence.
COMMENTARY: This section notifies both judges and parties that
the courts' remedial powers are very broad. The statute does
not replace existing remedies but expands the alternatives avail-
able to the victim.
Issuance of a protection order is preferable to criminal pros-
ecution in many cases because in a protection order hearing the
court focuses on the protection of the victim rather than on the
punishment or rehabilitation of the offender. The protection
order, however, is not intended to serve as an alternative to or
a substitute for prosecution. In some cases, victims elect to
pursue civil and criminal remedies simultaneously. In other
cases, particularly if a protection order has not been effective,
prosecution is a logical next step.
Judges sometimes hesitate to act on petitions for protection
orders in cases in which other criminal or domestic relations
proceedings are pending. 60 This section directs courts to act on
protection order petitions regardless of other pending proceed-
ings because many petitions are frequently filed in emergency
19 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A § (3) (West Supp. 1982-1983); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3113.31(G) (Page 1980 & Supp. 1982).
60 In New York it was formerly the case that if relief had been sought in domestic
relations court, the criminal court could not act. If a case had been referred for criminal
action, no protection order could be issued. See In re Ruth S. v. George S., 63 Misc.2d
1, 10, 311 N.Y.S.2d 169, 178 (1970).
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situations and the backlog of cases in many domestic relations
courts is often very long.
Copies of protection orders must be included in the files of
any other ongoing proceedings. The petition form requires list-
ing of other proceedings; therefore, the judge need only examine
the petition when issuing an order and add any court that is
handling a related matter to the list of places to which copies of
the order will be sent. This process may be facilitated by using
order forms with multiple carbon copies.
The section on domestic relations proceedings attempts to
balance the cursory nature of the protection order proceedings
and the consequent risk of error against the need for immediate
action to prevent physical danger to victims of domestic abuse
or their children. The risk of error would suggest deference to
any existing domestic relations order which may have been the
conclusion of a far more deliberative process. But the need for
immediate action suggests that a protection order should
supersede an existing domestic relations order. If, for example,
the custodial parent had begun sexually abusing a child and was
preparing to leave the country with the child to reside elsewhere,
a protection order could prohibit the removal of the child from
the jurisdiction and make a temporary transfer of custody to the
other parent. The increasing frequency of child-snatching makes
emergency remedies in such circumstances particularly
important. 6'
(E) Full Faith and Credit
(1) Any protection order issued pursuant to this Act shall be effec-
tive throughout the state in all districts and counties. 62
(2) Any protection order issued by the court of another state shall
be accorded full faith and credit and enforced as if it were an
order of this state.
COMMENTARY: The purpose of this section is to facilitate in-
trastate and interstate enforcement of protection orders. The
section directs police to enforce any protection order issued
within the state, even if they have had no contact with the court
that issued it. It also warns assailants that they may not escape
enforcement of a protection order by seeking out the victim in
another jurisdiction.
61 See generally P. HOFF, CHILD SNATCHING: INTERNATIONAL CHILD CUSTODY
LITIGATION (1981) (discussion of child-snatching and available remedies).
62 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173B:1 l-a (Supp. 1981).
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If a protection order is issued in one state, and the victim
then moves to another, the court in the second state must enter
a judgment on the order before it may be enforced in the second
state.63 This clause directs courts presented with foreign orders
to enforce them even if the relief granted is different from or
broader than the relief available under the law of the state in
which enforcement is sought.
This section is necessary because victims of abuse frequently
flee their abusers to another state or locality, only to be pursued
to their new location and victimized again. 64
4.02. Commencement of Action.
(A) Filing a Petition
(1) An action for a protection order may be commenced by filing a
verified petition with the clerk of the court or if the courts are
closed, with the judge, as described in section 4.03(E).
(2) Protection order petitions shall be available from the clerk of
the court at no charge to the parties.
(3) Protection order petitions may be filed either typed or legibly
handwritten.
(4) Protection order petitions used in civil proceedings shall use the
following form:65
I respectfully request that the Court enter an order protecting me and/or
other members of my household from abuse. In support of this request, I state
the following facts and swear that they are true:
1. Name(s), address(es), and telephone number(s) of persons needing pro-
tection from abuse (DO NOT LIST ADDRESS OR TELEPHONE NUMBER
IF DOING SO WOULD ENDANGER THE VICTIM):
2. Home and work addresses and telephone numbers of the abuser (the
respondent):
63 United States v. Pearson, 258 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (filing of Virgin Islands
judgment in New York Supreme Court clerk's office did not by itself render the action
enforceable); Bank of Sun Prairie v. Hovig, 218 F. Supp. 769 (W.D. Ark. 1963) (holding
that judgment in one state did not become enforceable in another state until a default
judgment was entered in the second).
'A "If the wife does manage to escape, her husband often stalks her like a hunted
animal. He scours the neighborhood, contacts friends and relatives, goes to all the likely
places where she may have sought refuge, and checks with public agencies to track her
down ....
"Unless she can afford to leave town and effectively to disappear, a woman is never
quite safe from a stalking husband. Sometimes the harassment, the threats and the
beatings continue for years after a wife has left." D. MARTIN, note 50, at 78 (1978). See
S. SCHECTER, supra note 4, at 223.
65 These forms are similar to forms that will appear in Seeking Ex Parte Relief, in I
MATRIMONIAL & FAM. L. PRAc. (MB) (1984).
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3. Relationship between victim and abuser (indicate any blood relationship,
present or former marriage, or present or former cohabitation or dating rela-
tionship):
Date of beginning (and end if applicable) of relationship:
4. On or about , 19. , the Respondent:
-Physically abused the Petitioner or other victim.
_____Committed some other act of domestic violence against the Petitioner
or other victim: Threat / Coercion / Sexual Assault / Harassment I Involun-
tary Confinement / Unlawful Entry I Damage to Property / Theft I Other: -
(circle act committed),
at the following location: by the following acts (describe
the incident in detail):
5. The Respondent has been abusing the victim for ----- months / years
(circle one) about __ times per week / month / year (circle one). The police
have been called -times; the victim has needed medical treatment for
injuries -times. Explain any relevant history.
Based on the incident described in paragraph 4, the following legal action
has been initiated or concluded (check if applicable):
_ Criminal Prosecution: [date started] [date of final order]
_____Divorce: [date started] [date of final order]
_.......Another petition for protection from abuse: [date started] [date of final
order]
-Custody: [date started] [date of final order]
__Other: [date started] [date of final order].
6. The Respondent continues to be a threat to the safety of the victim
because:
-. They share a residence;
-. The Respondent may become violent again;
___-Other:
7. To protect the victim from further abuse, I request that the following
relief be granted:
A. - That the Respondent be ordered not to abuse, harass, or threaten
the victim, or to commit any other domestic violence;
B. - That the Respondent be excluded from a shared residence and
that the victim be granted exclusive possession (NOTE: you may ask for
exclusive possession even if the residence is solely owned or leased by the
respondent; this order will have no effect on title);
C. - That the Respondent be ordered to stay away from the following
places, where the victim regularly goes (DO NOT LIST ANY ADDRESS
WHICH WOULD FURTHER ENDANGER THE VICTIM):
Residence:
_......._Place of employment:
_ School attended by victim or children:
_ Other place(s):
D. __ That the Respondent be ordered not to communicate with the
victim(s), in person, in writing, or by telephone, except that the Respondent
be permitted to communicate under the following circumstances: _ ;
E. - That the Respondent, if ordered to vacate a shared residence, be
ordered to make or to continue to make rent or mortgage payments on the
residence in the amount of $ payable to
F. - If the victim left or wishes to leave a shared residence to avoid
abuse, that the Respondent be ordered to pay the victim $_ per month
for rent at a new residence;
G. - If the victim is unable to provide support for herself/himself or
for her/his children, that the Respondent be ordered to make support payments
of $ per month (attach financial statement if requesting support);
H. - That the court grant to the victim temporary custody of the
following minor children: [Names] [Ages];
I. - That the Respondent be permitted to visit with the children only
on the following day(s), at the following place(s) and time(s), under the super-
vision of the following person(s):
1984] Domestic Abuse 81
J. __ That the Respondent be ordered to compensate the victim for the
following expenses, incurred as a result of the abuse:
Medical care: $_
Lost earnings: $






K. __ That the Respondent be ordered to give the following personal
property to the victim: (circle) automobile / checkbook / credit cards / keys I
other:
L. __ That the Respondent be ordered not to transfer, encumber, or
dispose of property owned by the victim or jointly owned;
M. __ That the Respondent be ordered to participate in a counseling
program designed to control violent behavior, by contacting
at _within two days of the date of this order, and that
Respondent submit a report from his counselor to the Court once every four
weeks from the date of this order until the program is completed;
N. __ That the Respondent be ordered to pay the cost of counseling for
himself/herself, the victim, or others affected by the violence (circle one or
more);
0. __ That a police officer serve and execute the protection order,
including supervising the Respondent in returning to the residence that Re-
spondent has been ordered to vacate to collect personal belongings;
P. __ That a police officer be ordered to accompany the victim to a
residence occupied by the Respondent to obtain physical custody of children
or to collect personal belongings;
Q. - That the Respondent be ordered to pay a fee of $_ to a
shelter for victims of domestic violence where the victim has resided or is
residing;
R. __ Other relief, as follows:
(5) Protection order petitions used in criminal proceedings shall use
the following form:
, the Complaining Witness / Prosecutor / Arresting Of-
ficer (circle one) in the above-captioned case, moves that a protection order
be issued to prevent injury to or intimidation of the Complaining Witness,
In support of this motion, it is stated that:
1. The Defendant has been charged with / convicted of (circle one) a violation
of
2. The relationship between the Complaining Witness and the Defendant is
(indicate any blood relationship, present or former marriage, or present or
former cohabitation or dating relationship):
Dates of beginning and end of relationship:
3. On or about , 19. , the Defendant:
Physically abused the Complaining Witness.
-_Committed some other act of domestic violence against the Complain-
ing Witness: Threat / Coercion I Sexual Assault / Harassment / Involuntary
Confinement / Unlawful Entry I Damage to Property / Theft / Other: __
(circle act committed),
at the following location: , by the following acts (de-
scribe the incident in detail):
4. The Defendant has been abusing the victim for months / years (circle one)
about ___times per week / month / year (circle one). The police have been
called times; the victim has needed medical treatment for injuries
times. Explain any relevant history.
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Based on the incident described in paragraph 3, the following legal action
has been initiated or concluded (check if applicable):
.- Divorce: [date started] [date of final order]
. A petition for protection from abuse: [date started] [date of final order]
-Custody: [date started] [date of final order]
-Other: [date started] [date of final order].
5. The Defendant continues to be a threat to the safety of the Complaining
Witness because:
-They share a residence;
-. The Defendant may become violent again;
-_Other:
THEREFORE, requests that the Court require the
Defendant:
1. - Not to abuse, harass, or threaten the Complaining Witness, or
commit any other domestic violence;
2. - To vacate a residence shared with the Complaining Witness and
allow her/him exclusive possession of the residence (NOTE: this relief may be
requested even if the residence is solely owned or leased by the Defendant;
the order will have no effect on title);
3. - To stay away from the following places, where the Complaining
Witness regularly goes (DO NOT LIST ANY ADDRESS WHICH WOULD
FURTHER ENDANGER THE COMPLAINING WITNESS):
_Residence:
__ Place of Employment:
-School attended by the Complaining Witness or children: .;
__Other place(s):
4. - Not to communicate with the Complaining Witness, in person, in
writing, or by telephone, except that the Defendant be permitted to commu-
nicate under the following circumstances:
5. - To make or continue to make rent or mortgage payments on a
residence that the Defendant is ordered to vacate in the amount of $
payable to
6. - To pay the Complaining Witness $ per month for rent at
another residence;
7. - To make support payments in the amount of $ per month
to the Complaining Witness if she/he is unable to provide adequate support for
herself/himself or for her/his children (attach financial statement if requesting
support).
It is further requested:
8. - That the Court grant temporary custody of the following minor
children to the Complaining Witness: [Names] [Ages];
9. - That the Defendant be permitted to visit with the children only on
the following day(s), and only at the following place(s) and time(s), under the
supervision of the following person(s)
10. - That the Defendant compensate the Complaining Witness for the
following expenses, incurred as a result of the crimes charged:
Medical care: $__
Lost Earnings: $._






11. - That the Defendant be ordered to give to the Complaining Witness
the following personal property: (circle) automobile / checkbook / credit cards
/ keys / other:
12. - That the Defendant not transfer, encumber, or dispose of property
owned by the Complaining Witness or jointly owned;
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13. __ That the Defendant participate in a counseling program designed
to control violent behavior, by contacting At
within two days of the date of this order, and that Defendant submit a report
from the counselor to the Court once every four weeks from the date of this
order until the program is completed;
14. __ That the Defendant pay the cost of counseling for himself/herself,
the Complaining Witness, or others affected by the violence (circle one or
more);
15. __ That a police officer serve and execute the protection order,
including supervising the Defendant in returning to a residence that the Defen-
dant has been ordered to vacate to collect personal belongings;
16. __ That a police officer accompany the Complaining Witness to a
residence occupied by the Defendant to obtain physical custody of children or
to collect personal belongings;
17. __ That the Defendant be ordered to pay a fee of $ to a shelter
for victims of domestic violence where the Complaining Witness has resided
or is residing;
18. __ Other relief, as follows:
(6) A petitioner seeking a protection order shall not be required to
reveal any current address or place of residence except to the
judge in camera for the purpose of determining jurisdiction and
venue. The petitioner may be required to provide a mailing
address unless the petitioner alleges that he or she would be
endangered by such disclosure would endanger the victim or
others.
COMMENTARY: This section attempts to facilitate speedy relief
by keeping procedures as simple as possible. Many abuse laws
now require filing of several forms, motions, and/or affidavits
to initiate an action for a protection order. This statute contem-
plates a simple, easy-to-read form on which the basis for juris-
diction and the relief requested can be presented by a petitioner
with no legal background. Under the Model Act, the clerk of
court would provide petitioners with the short form and offer
limited clerical assistance in completion of the forms.
The section permitting nondisclosure of the victim's address
is an attempt to protect a victim who has moved to a location
unknown to the abuser. Most battered women's shelters in the
United States keep their addresses secret. Victims should not
be required to choose between requesting legal protection from
the court and keeping their addresses secret from assailants.
(B) Who May File a Petition
(1) A person may seek an order of protection:
(a) for herself or himself;
(b) on behalf of a minor child, if the alleged abuser and/or the
child is a relative or a household member of the petitioner;
1984]
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(c) on behalf of any person prevented by physical or mental
incapacity from seeking an order of protection;
(d) on behalf of any household member who has been subject
to domestic violence, if the petitioner is endangered or ad-
versely affected by the abuse alleged against the household
member. 66
(2) A petitioner shall not be denied relief under this Act because:
(a) the petitioner used reasonable force in self defense against
violence by the respondent;67 or
(b) the petitioner or the respondent is a minor.
(3) Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a proceeding
involving issuance or enforcement of a protection order under
this Act, except as otherwise provided by law.
68
COMMENTARY: This section explains who may seek a petition
for a protection order, as distinguished from who may be cov-
ered under an order. In most cases of adult abuse, victims are
able to file on their own behalf. There are, however, many cases
of domestic abuse that involve children or incapacitated adults.
In such circumstances the law authorizes other concerned or
affected persons to bring the situation to the attention of the
court and to request relief on behalf of the victim. The Model
Act provides a private right of action for any victim. It allows
any person who is living with or related to the victim or the
abuser to file a petition on behalf of a minor child. The statute
does not permit social service agencies to petition for protection
orders for children or adults. If, however, a child abuse case
were assigned to a social service worker who felt that a protec-
tion order would be a useful option, he or she might encourage
relatives or household members of the victim to seek an order.
Although allowing the agencies to petition might be very useful
in some child abuse cases, the risks of such a procedure might
outweigh the benefits. Remedies may best be used by adults
who are very familiar with the child's situation. The Model Act
seeks to avoid further expansion of the social service interven-
tion model.
Subsection (c) provides that anyone can file a petition on
behalf of an adult who is incapacitated. This is a less intrusive
6See Illinois Domestic Violence Act § 202(b), ILL. ANN. STAT ch. 40, 2302-2(b)
(Smith-Hurd 1982).
67 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 769 (1981).
61 Id., § 768(4).
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variant of the most common child abuse laws which mandate
intervention by disinterested outsiders because children are
often unable to seek help. If an adult is able to assert his or her
own rights, there is a privacy interest in avoiding intervention
that is not requested by the victim. Where the adult cannot
request help, the interest in preventing violence must take prior-
ity over the privacy interest.
Subsection (d), which gives a right of action to a person not
abused but adversely affected by the respondent's abuse of
another person, is addressed to a situation in which the victim
is less willing or able to take steps to stop the abuse than other
household members or relatives. While the law does not allow
a stranger to intervene on behalf of any victim, it does allow
intervention by intimates of victims who are affected by the
abuse. This provision generally follows a policy articulated in
Lucke v. Lucke. 69 In that case, the North Dakota Supreme Court
upheld the lower court's issuance of a protection order to an
eighteen-year-old girl whose three sisters had been sexually
abused by their father. The order protected all of the daughters.
Subsection (2) states that eligibility for relief is unaffected by
violent action taken by the petitioner in self-defense. The courts
may not interpret the law to allow relief only to petitioners with
"clean hands." In a situation involving "mutual combat" or in
which petitions are filed by each party against the other, the
court should, under this provision, grant relief to the party who
was more seriously injured or has been battered more fre-
quently. Only in a rare case should protection orders be granted
to each party against the other.
A harder case is presented when a petition is filed by the
abusive party but not by the victim. In such circumstances the
court has no power to issue an order against the petitioner. It
can only decline relief and advise the respondent of her right to
relief.
Petitions may be filed by minors under the model law. In
many situations, a child may be the only person other than the
parties who knows the extent of the violence being perpetrated
by one parent against another. Exposure to domestic abuse is
harmful to children.70 Those who are sufficiently literate and
mobile to go to the courthouse and fill out a petition should not
69 Lucke v. Lucke, 300 N.W.2d 231 (N.D. 1980).
70 See generally Sussman, supra note 11; Thomas, Custody Litigation Strategies for
Battered Women, 8 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. (1984) (in press).
1984]
Harvard Journal on Legislation
be deprived of the remedy on the basis of age. If a child requests
protection for an adult and the adult objects, in many cases the
court might decline to grant relief. However, it might be appro-
priate to evict a man who abuses his wife and his children even
if the wife objects to the order. The woman would be required
to give her children's safety priority over her emotional attach-
ment to the abuser.
The Model Act points out that intoxication does not excuse
abusive behavior. Many people engaged in patterns of violence
against family members only become violent when they are
drunk. One researcher suggests that abusers drink in order to
give themselves permission to be violent, and that the physio-
logical effects of the alcohol are not the cause of the violence.
71
(C) Right to Proceed Pro Se; Court Clerk Assistance
(1) Each party may proceed with or without legal representation at
any or all stages of protection order proceedings.
72
(2) Clerks of court shall provide all parties with information about:
(a) the availability of protection orders;
(b) procedures for filing petitions for protection orders;
(c) the right of parties to proceed with or without legal repre-
sentation as they may choose;
(d) the procedures for waiver of filing and service of process
fees; and
(e) the right of the petitioner to have her place of residence
remain secret.
(3) Clerks of court or other persons designated by the court shall
assist the parties in completing and filing the petition, affidavits,
summons, answer, petition to proceed in forma pauperis, and
other papers and pleadings necessary to initiate or respond to a
petition for a protection order.
(4) The clerks of court shall not render advice or services to parties
in protection order proceedings that call for the professional
judgment of a lawyer.
73
71 See A. GANLEY, COURT-MANDATED COUNSELING FOR MEN WHO BATTER: A
THREE-DAY WORKSHOP FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 34-35, 53-54 (1981).
7-. See HAWAII REV. STAT. § 585-3 (Supp. 1980).
7- See Lerman & Livingston, supra note 1, at 6-7. See generally ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, § 764(2) (1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.025 (Vernon Supp. 1983) (clerk
may explain forms to unrepresented litigants; this does not constitute practicing law);
N.J. STAT, ANN. § 2C:25-12(c) (West 1982); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY EC 3-5 (1976).
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COMMENTARY: The law must be structured to allow pro se
proceedings to make protection orders available to indigent vic-
tims of abuse who seek court assistance. Poor women who are
battered seek help from the police more than twice as often as
women with higher incomes. 74 Unless the law also allows clerks
to explain to petitioners that they may seek waiver of court filing
fees, petitioners may wrongly believe that they cannot afford to
go to court.
To allow pro se petitions is not to disparage the value of
representation in a protection order proceeding. Particularly in
situations in which temporary custody or support is sought, or
in which visitation restrictions are requested, legal assistance
may help the victim to understand and assert her rights. If the
victim proceeds without counsel, she might request less support
than she is entitled to, and inevitably, such an award might
influence a subsequent support award in a divorce proceeding.
But the cutbacks in legal services and the rising cost of private
legal assistance effectively foreclose the preferred option of
providing counsel for all victims of abuse. Therefore, the pro-
cedural requirements of the Model Act are extremely simple
and may be understood by someone with no legal training.
Many state laws now require that clerks of court provide
minimal assistance to pro se parties. 75 This provides the parties
with access to someone who can answer questions about the
procedure for obtaining a protection order and facilitates smooth
proceedings. Despite the acceptance of this practice in federal
courts and in small claims courts, a constitutional challenge was
made to a provision in the Minnesota abuse act requiring clerk
assistance to victims. In State v. Errington,76 the Supreme Court
of Minnesota interpreted the legislative requirement that "the
court" assist victims of domestic abuse to require assistance by
the court clerk rather than the judge. The court further held that
this provision did not violate the separation of powers doctrine
or create a biased court by mandating assistance only to victims
of abuse and not to respondents.
74 One major study conducted in Kentucky found that 14% of incidents of spouse
abuse involving lower income women (household income below $7500) were reported
to the police, and only 6% of incidents were reported when the victims lived in house-
holds earning $15,000 or more. M. SCHULMAN, supra note 16, at 36 (1979).
I- See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 30-5-1 to -11 (Supp. 1982); CAL. CIv. CODE § 4359 (West
1983); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 545-553 (West Supp. 1983). See generally Lerman &
Livingston, supra note I, at 6-7.
7' 310 N.W.2d 681 (Minn. 1981).
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In the Model Act, however, the clerks are directed to assist
both petitioners and respondents, so that neither need be rep-
resented by counsel, and so that both parties will have access
to information about court procedures.
Court clerks, however, may not render legal advice without
a license to practice law. The line between clerical assistance
and legal advice is not an easy one to draw. Subsection (4)'
prohibits court clerks from giving legal advice to parties. If the
assistance offered is limited to explaining court procedures,
explaining how to fill out forms, or in the case of illiterate
parties, acting as a scribe, no question of unauthorized practice
is presented. 77 More difficult questions arise when a petitioner
is literate but cannot write a coherent statement of facts, or
when a petitioner asks the clerk if her relationship to her as-
sailant would make her eligible for a protection order. To the
extent that questions can be answered or assistance offered
without the exercise of the type of professional judgment which
requires legal training, clerks may facilitate the conduct of ex-
pedient court proceedings without violating the unauthorized
practice laws. But if, for example, the petitioner requests an
analysis of a point of law that is susceptible of varied interpre-
tation, the clerk should decline to respond because such assis-
tance would constitute legal advice. 78
Ethical Consideration 3-5 states:
It is neither necessary nor desirable to attempt the formulation of a single,
specific definition of what constitutes the practice of law. Functionally, the
practice of law relates to the rendition of services for others that call for the
professional judgment of a lawyer . . . . Where this professional judgment is
not involved, non-lawyers, such as court clerks .... [and others] may engage
in occupations that require a special knowledge of law in certain areas.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-5 (1976).
18 In Florida Bar v. Furman, 376 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1979), a secretary was found to
have engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by providing customers with do-it-
yourself divorce kits and by helping them to fill out forms and to prepare for pro se
court appearances. The clerk assistance authorized by the Model Act is similar in some
respects to the conduct found illegal in Furman but is clearly distinguishable.
Several factors distinguish the clerk assistance provisions of the Model Act from the
situation addressed by the Florida Supreme Court in Furman. Most important, in
Furman there was no explicit statute authorizing the conduct in question. The clerk
assistance in the Model Act is quite literally authorized and therefore not illegal. Under
the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.5 (1983), the question of whether
the assistance contemplated in the Act may be authorized is indirectly addressed:
A lawyer shall not:
(a) practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the
legal profession in that jurisdiction; or
(b) assist a person who is not a member of the bar in the performance of
activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.
Comment: The definition of the practice of law is established by law and varies
from one jurisdiction to another. Whatever the definition, limiting the practice
[Vol. 21:61
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Alternative 1
(D) Filing and Service Fees: Petitions of Poor Persons
(1) A petitioner may file an affidavit stating that he or she is seeking
a protection order and lacks the funds to pay for filing and
service. If such an affidavit is filed, the petition shall be filed
and service shall be made without payment of costs or prior
leave of the court to proceed in forma pauperis.
(2) When the petition is filed without payment of costs, the court
shall determine at the hearing on the petition whether the peti-
tioner or the respondent is indigent. If the court finds that the
petitioner is not indigent, the court may order the petitioner to
pay the court costs. If the respondent is found not to be indigent
and the petitioner prevails on the merits, the respondent may
be ordered to pay court costs.
(3) In determining whether a petitioner has the funds available to
pay the costs of filing and service under this Act, the income of
the respondent shall not be considered.
79
Alternative 2
(D) Filing and Service Fees: Petitions of Poor Persons. No fees shall be
charged for forms, filing of petitions, service of petitions or orders,
copies of orders, or other services provided by this Act. 80
of law to members of the bar protects the public against renOltion o regal
services by unqualified persons.
This suggests that a state has some discretion to define what is or is not the practice
of law, and to authorize some assistance to non-lawyers by persons not admitted to the
bar. The Model Act takes care to prohibit clerks from offering advice on legal matters
which involve judgment calls because such opinions require professional judgment. This
is consistent with the purpose stated in the Proposed Rules for prohibiting unauthorized
practice.
Second, the services in Furman were offered by a business for profit. The business
included no one with legal training or with the duties of an officer of the court. In the
Model Act, advice would be offered by non-lawyers who are court employees. They
would not be paid by those to whom they offered advice, and would be advising primarily
those who could not afford to pay for the advice of a lawyer. These differences mean
that the services offered are in the public interest, that the clerks are not competing for
business with the private bar. Clerks offering advice, because they work in the courts,
are likely to have a clear sense of the limits of their authority, and to have access to
professional advice about what assistance they may or may not offer.
A final distinction betweeen Furman and the clerk assistance provisions of this Act
is that there is a longstanding tradition of court assistance to pro se petitioners, both to
ensure that citizens have access to court even if they cannot afford to pay lawyers, and
to assist the court in processing the often unpolished claims filed by pro se petitioners.
In Furman, the primary purpose of the service was to generate income; in the Model
Act, the purpose is to help indigent citizens and to provide ministerial functions nec-
essary to the administration of the courts.
79 See Illinois Domestic Violence Act § 207(a), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 1 2302-7
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982).
80 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:3(II) (Supp. 1981).
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COMMENTARY: This subsection presents two alternative meth-
ods of fee waiver. The first enables the court to determine
eligibility for fee waiver on a case-by-case basis; the second is
automatic and applies in all cases. The option of fee waiver, like
the pro se provisions, may determine whether the remedy will
be available to those who need it or whether most victims will
be unable to enforce their legal rights due to lack of funds. In
some courts the cost of filing and service is as high as sixty to
one hundred dollars. 8' The need for fee waiver provisions is
stronger in states in which the courts impose high filing fees.
Several considerations are relevant in determining if the state
abuse law should waive fees in all abuse cases or should require
case-by-case determination. Most important, because victims of
abuse frequently will file pro se, each additional procedural
requirement will deter some people from requesting relief. A
blanket fee waiver would not maximize victims' access to legal
protection. A legislature should also consider whether the court
system can afford to subsidize protection order proceedings and
whether the additional cost to the court of processing and de-
termining in forma pauperis petitions would be greater than the
income received from fees paid. If in forma pauperis petitions
would be filed and granted in a high percentage of abuse cases,
the income received from filing fees might be small.
Alternative 1 requires that respondent's income not be attrib-
uted to the petitioner in determining eligibility for fee waiver.
In many abusive relationships, the batterer controls family fi-
nances and the victim has no access to cash, bank accounts, or
credit cards. Many abusers will go to great lengths to prevent
their victims from calling the police, going to court, or seeking
other help. Therefore, the victim must have the option to file a
petition in secret, without asking her abuser for money to go to
court.
4.03. Hearings: Civil Proceedings.
(A) Emergency Conditions. The respondent is entitled to notice and
hearing prior to issuance of a protection order unless the petitioner
demonstrates the existence of an emergency by:
81 Lerman, Protection of Battered Women: A Survey of State Legislation, 6 WOMEN'S
RTS. L. REP. 271, 279 (1980). In particular, some courts in California, Kentucky, Ohio,




(1) A showing that the petitioner or other victim was recently the
victim of an act or acts of domestic violence committed by the
respondent that resulted in physical or emotional injury or dam-
age to property; or
(2) Alleging that the petitioner or others are likely to suffer harm
if the respondent is given notice.
8 2
COMMENTARY: In many abuse cases, victims seek help at a
point of dire emergency, during or immediately after an abusive
incident.83 Often a protection order must be issued before giving
notice to the respondent because of the imminent danger of
further harm.
The purpose of this section is to define when an emergency
exists. "Emergency" is defined to include situations in which
some harm has recently been inflicted - as evidence of possible
future or continuing harm - as well as instances in which there
is an evident danger of serious harm unless an order is issued
without the delay that would be necessary to give the respondent
notice. The second part of the definition recognizes that if the
victim of abuse tells the abuser that she might seek help, he
may respond by threatening more serious violence. 84 These
threats may prevent the victim from leaving the situation or
from seeking protection. By punishing the victim for filing a
protection order petition, the abuser may persuade her to with-
draw the petition or simply to fail to appear on the court date.
Most existing laws are less specific than the model law in
their articulation of what may be included as an emergency
situation justifying ex parte relief. Most of the statutes simply
authorize ex parte relief whenever there is "immediate and pres-
ent danger of abuse". In some jurisdictions, conservative judges
have refused to grant ex parte orders because they view the
remedies provided by the law as inappropriate. 85 The specificity
of this draft is designed to overcome judicial reticence that might
narrow the definition of "emergency". More explicit statutory
direction is more difficult to misinterpret.
Ex parte orders that involve deprivations of liberty or prop-
82 See WLDF AMENDMENTS, supra note 44, § 16-1003(b) (referring to bodily harm).
"I Walker points out, however, that some women are immobilized by the abuse and
do nothing for a few days after a beating. L. WALKER, supra note 26, at 64, 66.
84 D. MARTIN, supra note 50, at 77-81.
85 For example, in Memphis, Tennessee, after a state protection order law was enacted
in 1979, the judges joined together not only in refusing to enforce the law, but in working
to repeal it. "Judges Ignore Law Shielding Abused Wives," Memphis Press-Scimitar,
Oct. 27, 1979, at 1. This attempt was unsuccessful.
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erty (such as eviction of the respondent from his residence and
restrictions on visitation with children) are consistent with the
Due Process Clause only if notice and opportunity for a hearing
are postponed rather than cancelled, and if procedural protec-
tions are provided to minimize the deprivation.
The section defining emergency conditions restates current
due process doctrine. 86 Ex parte orders may be issued only when
harm would result from prior notice and hearing. The orders
must be issued by judges and there must be a showing that harm
might result from delay. The notice and opportunity for hearing
must be provided as soon as possible after the order is issued.
8 7
(B) Ex Parte Relief. If an emergency exists, a petition for a protection
order shall be heard ex parte or granted based on the allegations
contained in the petition and affidavit. Such petitions shall be given
priority over all other docketed matters and shall be decided by a
judge available for emergency proceedings the same day the petition
is filed, or the following morning if the petition is filed after 4:00
p.m. If the judge finds that the petitioner for ex parte relief has
proven by a preponderance of evidence 88 that emergency conditions
6 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See generally, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW § 10-14 (1978).
87 Cf. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. 1982) (upholding the constitutionality
of ex parte procedures contained in the Missouri Adult Abuse Act against state and
federal due process challenges). For an extensive discussion of the due process issue
as it relates to remedies for battered women, see Taub, Equitable Relief in Cases of
Adult Domestic Violence, 6 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 241 (1981).
18 The preponderance standard as it is used here means that "the existence of a
contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence." C. McCoRMICK, MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972). Although this standard is generally applied in a
comparative fashion to find one set of evidence more convincing than opposing evidence,
it would be applied in an ex parte hearing to determine whether affirmative evidence of
domestic violence was convincing by itself. The petitioner is required to prove more
facts in an ex parte hearing (i.e., she must prove the presence of conditions requiring
emergency action), but the standard of proof is the same whether the respondent is
present or not. That standard is that the trier of fact must find it somewhat more likely
than not that the acts in question occurred.
While some states might wish to impose a standard of "clear and convincing" proof
before issuing ex parte protection orders, the case law suggests that a lower standard
is permissible. In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), the Supreme Court held on
the facts that clear and convincing proof was required to commit involuntarily an
individual to a mental institution for an indefinite period of time. In protection order
proceedings, the low risk of erroneous decision and the rapid opportunity for correction
of any error makes application of a less demanding standard of proof appropriate.
To apply a higher standard of proof would be to subvert the intention of the law
because so many women come into court in emergency circumstances without having
had a chance to prepare formally to prove their allegations. The higher standard might
operate to deny relief in many of the cases for which the ex parte provisions are intended.
The Court explained in Addington that the burden of proof functions to "allocate the
risk of error between the litigants." Id. at 423. When the burden of proof is a prepon-
derance of evidence, "[t]he litigants share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion."
Id. This seems a fair approach in this case because an error in denying needed relief
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are present and that an act of domestic violence has occurred, the
judge shall grant any of the requested relief contained in section
4.05(A) No Further Abuse, (B) Exclusive Possession, (C) Stay
Away, (D) No Communication, (I) Temporary Custody and Visita-
tion, and (0) Police Supervision of Return to Residence. In an
emergency situation, the judge may grant any other necessary re-
lief.89 The ex parte protection order will remain in effect pending a
full hearing. If a hearing is continued, the ex parte order may be
extended until the hearing is completed.
COMMENTARY: This section establishes procedures for issuing
emergency orders. The language of the Model Act is largely
original. Most advocates for battered women believe that to
provide effective protection the protection order law must con-
tain simple proof requirements and provide for almost contem-
poraneous relief.90
The requirement that the ex parte hearing be held the same
day a petition is filed was suggested by several reviewers who
agreed that a prompt response to the needs of victims of do-
mestic violence is crucial. A delay of one or two days between
petition and order could be dangerous to many petitioners.
In contrast to proceedings for child custody or support, the
petitioner is not required to submit detailed proof of her entitle-
ment to each type of relief requested. Once she establishes that
she is a victim of domestic violence, she need only prove that
the relief is needed to protect her from subsequent violence.
The nature of the relief granted should be related to the se-
riousness of the alleged abuses. For example, a judge might
decline to grant an eviction order absent a showing that there
had been or was likely to be serious physical abuse. If a peti-
tioner demonstrates that she has been injured, a judge might
grant her temporary custody of her children merely upon a
could cost the petitioner her physical well-being or even her life. An erroneous grant of
relief would at worst exclude the respondent from his residence for a few days or a
week.
Finally, the relief granted in protection orders has consequences far less drastic and
permanent than those cases in which the Supreme Court has previously required proof
by clear and convincing evidence. Even if the abuser is asked to vacate his residence
for a year (after a final hearing) the deprivation is far less than that imposed by
involuntary indefinite hospitalization in a mental institution, id., by deportation, Woodby
v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966), or by denaturalization, Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S.
350 (1960).
89 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.26(C) (Page Supp. 1982).
90 Most state laws require only a showing of threats of imminent violence rather than
proof that violence has already occurred. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 30-5-1 to -11 (Supp.
1982); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1001 to -1006 (1981 & Supp. 1983).
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showing that continued coresidence of the parties would create
a continuing danger. No hard lines should be drawn here; the
circumstances of abusive relationships vary so widely that broad
judicial discretion is necessary.
In many jurisdictions where these remedies exist, it has been
necessary to educate the private bar and the judiciary that relief
should not be requested under the abuse law except to protect
individuals from domestic violence. Attorneys who are unfa-
miliar with the abuse laws sometimes petition for a protection
order to expedite temporary resolution of support, custody, or
visitation issues in domestic relations cases in which there has
been no violence. This may be a particular problem in jurisdic-
tions with crowded dockets and long backlogs. If the private
bar is not educated and inappropriate petitions are filed, some
judges may become suspicious of legitimate petitions and be-
come more reluctant to grant relief.
Alternative 1: Required Second Hearing.
(C) Due Process
(1) The court shall schedule a full hearing within fourteen days
after the date that any ex parte order is issued. If the respondent
wishes to be heard sooner than the date set by the court, then
after at least two days notice to the petitioner, or after such
shorter notice as the court may prescribe, the respondent may
appear and move for the dissolution or modification of that
order. The court shall hear such motion as expeditiously as
possible. 91
(2) If after the hearing the court finds that allegations of abuse have
been proven by a preponderance of the evidence, a final protec-
tion order shall be issued that may include the relief granted in
the ex parte order and any additional relief requested by the
petitioner.
Alternative 2: Optional Second Hearing.
(C) Due Process
(1) When an ex parte order is issued, the respondent may file a
request for a hearing with the clerk of the court within twenty
days after being served with the order. Such hearings shall be
scheduled after at least two days notice to the petitioner or after
such shorter notice as the court may prescribe.




(2) A full hearing may also be requested by the petitioner if all of
the relief requested in the ex parte hearing is not granted or for
other appropriate reasons. Such hearings shall be scheduled
after at least five days notice to the respondent or after such
shorter notice as the court may prescribe.
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(3) If the judge issuing the ex parte order determines that a full
hearing is necessary, he or she may order sua sponte that a full
hearing be held at which both parties may present evidence.
Such hearing shall be scheduled after at least five days notice to
both parties or after such shorter notice as the court may
prescribe.
(4) If after hearing evidence from both parties, the court is satisfied
that allegations of abuse have been proven by a preponderance
of the evidence, the court shall issue a final protection order.
(5) If a full evidentiary hearing is not ordered by the judge, and
none is requested by the petitioner or the respondent within
twenty days after proof of service is filed, the ex parte order
shall become a final order.
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COMMENTARY: Most jurisdictions require that a full hearing be
held before a final order may be issued. A minority of states,
however, provide that ex parte orders will become final unless
a hearing is requested. The former alternative is the recom-
mended approach in the Model Act. The section requires that
a full hearing be scheduled within fourteen days after the order
is issued, or sooner if the respondent so requests.
Requiring a second hearing before issuing a final order is
desirable for several reasons. First, the law may be less vulner-
able to a constitutional challenge if the burden to request a
hearing is not imposed on the respondent. The laws that require
no second hearing should be able to survive a constitutional
challenge if appropriate due process protections are included,
but the more conservative approach may be less likely to elicit
a challenge.
Second, the law provides that only some of the listed relief
may be included in the ex parte order (no abuse, stay away,
eviction, custody, and visitation) because other relief is less
responsive to the immediate danger, and because a more formal
hearing is appropriate to determine whether certain available
relief (e.g., support, monetary compensation, two-year eviction)
shall be granted.
'See Illinois Domestic Violence Act § 204(c), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 2302-4(c)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:6 (Supp. 1979).
91 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 765 (1981).
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Finally, protection orders that are issued after a hearing at
which the abuser is present may be more effective than those
which are issued ex parte. If the judge confronts the abuser in
public with the prohibitions contained in the order and empha-
sizes the consequences of violation, the abuser may take the
order more seriously.94 In many cases, the abuser will not appear
for the full hearing, at which time all of the relief provided in
the law becomes available on default, subject to ex parte proof.
The second alternative provides that after an ex parte order
is granted, a hearing may be requested by the petitioner or the
respondent any time within twenty days after the order is issued.
It provides that hearings shall be held within five days after the
party not requesting the hearing receives notice. A hearing may
also be ordered by the judge even if not requested by either
party. If no one requests that a full hearing be held at which
both parties may present evidence, the temporary order auto-
matically becomes a final order.
This optional second hearing approach was included in the
Model Act for several reasons. First, it imposes less of a burden
on courts and parties by not requiring that a hearing be held
unless one of the parties or the judge deems it necessary. Judicial
efficiency in these matters is necessary because of the high
volume of petitions for protection orders.
Second, this section is premised on the notion that where
sufficient evidence of abuse has been put forward to demon-
strate the need for an emergency order, it is likely that continued
court protection is necessary. Research has demonstrated that
most violent relationships go through cycles - each assault
may be followed by a period of calm, but the violence tends to
recur and to escalate over time.95 Victims often believe promises
that "it will never happen again" and abandon court action they
have initiated, not realizing that the peace is only temporary.
Victims also may be subject to retaliation after a temporary
order is issued and may be coerced not to appear at any sub-
sequent proceedings. By requiring a second appearance to get
more than a few weeks' relief, the legislature essentially dares
the abuser to try to abort further proceedings.
Finally, the benefit of a longer period of protection generally
outweighs the possible harm from allowing maturation of an ex
14I have observed the deterrent effect of verbal interaction between judges and
offenders in the District of Columbia Superior Court.
91A. GANLEY, supra note 71, at 16.
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parte order into a final order. Many orders merely prohibit
conduct that is already illegal. At any time either party can file
a petition for modification of an order. This would enable the
court to correct any error made by continuance of an order
without a full hearing.
Because second hearings will not be held in many cases, relief
should be granted ex parte with the knowledge that the order
may remain in effect without modification for a specified period
of up to two years. Each order should specify what relief will
be added in the final order and what the duration of the final
order will be if no further hearing is held in the case.
Under Alternative 2, the victim is permitted to request a full
hearing for two reasons. First, sometimes the victim knows that
the abuser will not obey the order unless he is told in person by
a judge that he must do so. In some cases, the victim will be
granted some but not all of the relief she requested in an ex
parte petition. Thus, the petitioner may request a full hearing in
order to obtain all of the relief for which she initially applied.
In either of these circumstances, it is appropriate that the re-
spondent be given notice and a full hearing be held.
This Act permits a judge to order a full hearing sua sponte
because in some cases ex parte proof is inadequate to justify
long-term relief. Particularly in cases in which the petitioner
requests temporary child custody, possession of substantial
property, or support for herself or her children, the judge may
wish to hear evidence from both parties.
When second hearings are to be held, the statute provides
that ex parte orders must remain in effect until after the full
hearing in cases. If the ex parte order expires before a final
order is issued, the abuser may view that gap in legal protection
as permission from the court to violate the terms of the order.
(D) Protection Orders issued under this Act shall use the following forms:
(1) Ex Parte Order of Protection and Notice of Hearing
After reviewing the verified petition requesting an ex parte order of protec-
tion, this Court finds that there is good cause to believe that the petitioner and/
or others are in immediate danger of abuse and that such an order should be
issued.
THEREFORE THE COURT ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:
That respondent,
1. __ Not abuse or threaten the Petitioner or other alleged victims, or
commit any other act of domestic violence, including battery, assault, coercion,
sexual assault, harassment, unlawful imprisonment, unlawful entry, damage to
property, theft, or other acts prohibited by the criminal code of this State;
1984]
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2. - Vacate the residence at and relinquish tem-
porary possession of that residence to the victim(s) (this order will not affect
title to the property);






4. - Avoid all communication with the victim(s) in writing, in person,
or by telephone, except that communication is permitted under the following
limited circumstances:
5. - That custody of the minor children listed below be granted to the
Petitioner: [Names] [Ages];
6. - That Respondent may visit with children only on the following
day(s), and only at the following place(s) and time(s), and under the supervision
of the following person(s):
7. - That this order be served and executed by a police officer including
supervising the Respondent in returning to his residence to collect personal
belongings; and
8. - That a police officer be ordered to accompany the victim to a
residence occupied by a Respondent to obtain physical custody of children or
to collect personal belongings.
WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER BY COMMISSION OF AN
ACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, INCLUDING ENTRY INTO A RESI-
DENCE IN VIOLATION OF A VACATE ORDER, IS A MISDEMEANOR
PUNISHABLE BY UP TO TWELVE MONTHS IMPRISONMENT AND!
OR A FINE OF UP TO $1,000. A SECOND VIOLATION IS A FELONY
PUNISHABLE BY NOT LESS THAN SEVENTY-TWO HOURS IMPRIS-
ONMENT AND NOT MORE THAN TWO YEARS, AND/OR A FINE OF
UP TO $2,000.
VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER OTHER THAN BY ABUSIVE BEHAV-
IOR IS CONTEMPT OF COURT AND PUNISHABLE IN ACCORDANCE
WITH LAW.
Notice of Hearing
A full hearing on the Petition will be held at the above-listed Court at
on , 19- . At that time you may appear with or without
counsel and present testimony. Failure to appear may result in a default judg-
ment for the petitioner.
You are entitled to request an immediate hearing on this matter. To request
a different hearing date, go to the Clerk's office at and
request an application for hearing. The petitioner must be notified at least two
days prior to the date set.
Copies of this order shall be furnished by the Clerk to the
(law enforcement agency).
(2) Full Civil Protection Order
After reviewing the verified petition requesting an order of protection, and
properly notifying the respondent that a hearing was scheduled on this matter,
and hearing the testimony of (the parties / the petitioner, upon default by the
respondent), this Court finds that the petitioner has proven the allegations of
domestic violence by a preponderance of the evidence.
THEREFORE THE COURT ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:
That respondent, I
1. - Not abuse or threaten the petitioner or other alleged victims, or
commit any other act of domestic violence, including battery, assault, coercion,
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sexual assault, harassment, unlawful imprisonment, unlawful entry, damage to
property, theft, or other acts prohibited by the criminal code of this State;
2. __ Vacate the residence at and relinquish tem-
porary possession of that residence to the victim(s) (this will not affect title to
the property);






4. -__ Avoid all communication with the victim(s) in writing, in person,
or by telephone, except that communication is permitted under the following
limited circumstances:
5. __ Make or continue to make rent or mortgage payments on the
residence vacated in the amount of $ payable to
6. - Pay the victim $ _ per month for rent on a separate residence
from the Respondent;
7. - Provide support for the victim and/or minor children in the amount
of $ per month;
8. __ Give physical custody of minor children to the Petitioner, on
., at
9. __ Visit with the children only on the following day(s), at the follow-
ing places and times, and under the supervision of the following person(s):
10. - Compensate the victim in the amount of $ for expenses
incurred as a result of the abuse;
11. Give possession of the following items of personal property to the
Petitioner or other specified victims:
12. - Not transfer, encumber, or otherwise dispose of property owned
by the victim or jointly owned;
13. - Participate in a counseling program designed to control violent
behavior by contacting at _within two
days of the date of this order, and that Respondent submit a report from the
counselor to the Court once every four weeks from the date of this order until
the program is completed;
14. - Pay the costs of counseling for himself/herself, or for _ ;
15. - Pay a fee of $ _ to a shelter for victims of domestic violence
where the victim has resided or is residing;
16. - Other relief as follows:
THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS THAT:
17. - Custody of the minor children listed below will be granted to the
Petitioner: [Names] [Ages];
18. - That a police officer shall accompany the Petitioner to a residence
occupied by Respondent to obtain physical custody of children or to collect
personal belongings;
19. __ A police officer shall serve and execute the protection order,
including supervising the Respondent in returning to a residence that the Re-
spondent has been ordered to vacate to collect personal belongings;
20. - Other relief, as follows:
This Order shall remain in effect for - months, until
but may be renewed, extended, or modified upon motion of either party.
WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER BY COMMISSION OF AN
ACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, INCLUDING ENTRY INTO A RESI-
DENCE IN VIOLATION OF A VACATE ORDER, IS A MISDEMEANOR
PUNISHABLE BY UP TO TWELVE MONTHS IMPRISONMENT AND/
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OR A FINE OF UP TO $1,000. A SECOND VIOLATION IS A FELONY
PUNISHABLE BY NOT LESS THAN SEVENTY-TWO HOURS IMPRIS-
ONMENT AND NOT MORE THAN TWO YEARS, AND/OR A FINE OF
UP TO $2,000.
VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER OTHER THAN BY ABUSIVE BEHAV-
IOR IS CONTEMPT OF COURT AND PUNISHABLE IN ACCORDANCE
WITH LAW.
(3) Full Criminal Protection Order
The Defendant, , has been charged with / convicted of
(circle one) a violation of , against a person protected under
the Remedies for Domestic Abuse Act. The Court, finding it likely that the
Defendant may injure or intimidate the victim in the future,
ORDERS, as a condition of release I probation that:
The Defendant,
1. - Not abuse or threaten the Complaining Witness or other alleged
victims, or commit any other act of domestic violence, including battery,
assault, coercion, sexual assault, harassment and unlawful imprisonment, un-
lawful entry, damage to property, theft, or other acts prohibited by the criminal
code of this State;
2. - Vacate the residence at and give temporary
possession of that residence to the Complaining Witness (this will not affect
title to the property);
3. - Stay away from the following place(s) frequented by the Com-





4. - Avoid all communication with the Complaining Witness in writing,
in person, or by telephone, except that communication is permitted under the
following limited circumstances:
5. - Make or continue to make rent or mortgage payments on the
residence vacated in the amount of $ per month payable to _ ;
6. - Pay the Complaining Witness $ per month for rent on a
separate residence from the Defendant;
7. - Provide support for the Complaining Witness and/or minor chil-
dren in the amount of $ _ per month;
8. - Give possession of minor children to the Complaining Witness on
, at , and visit with children only on
the following day(s), and only at the following place(s) and time(s), and under
the supervision of the following person(s):
9. - Compensate the Complaining Witness in the amount of $.,
for expenses incurred as a result of the abuse;
10. - Give possession of the following items of personal property to
the Complaining Witness:
1I. - Not transfer, encumber, or otherwise dispose of property owned
by the Complaining Witness or jointly owned;
12. - Participate in a counseling program designed to control violent
behavior, by contacting at _within two days of the date of
this order, and that Defendant submit a report from the counselor to the Court
once every four weeks from the date of this order until the program is
completed;
13. - Pay the costs of counseling for himself/herself, or for __ ;
14. - Pay a fee of $_ to a shelter for victims of domestic violence
where the Complaining Witness resides or has resided;
15. - Other relief, as follows:
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THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS THAT:
16. - Custody of the minor children listed below will be granted to the
Complaining Witness: [Names] [Ages];
17. __ A police officer shall accompany the Complaining Witness to a
residence where the Defendant resides to obtain physical custody of children
or to collect personal belongings;
18. - A police officer shall serve and execute the protection order,
including supervising the Defendant in returning to a residence that the Defen-
dant has been ordered to vacate to collect personal belongings.
19. - Other relief, as follows:
This Order shall remain in effect until the above-indicated case has come to
trial and the Defendant has been sentenced if found guilty, or, if a condition of
probation, until , when the period of probation expires.
The order may be modified upon motion of either party.
WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER BY COMMISSION OF AN
ACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, INCLUDING ENTRY INTO A RESI-
DENCE IN VIOLATION OF A VACATE ORDER, IS A MISDEMEANOR
PUNISHABLE BY TWELVE MONTHS IMPRISONMENT AND/OR A
FINE OF UP TO $I,000. A SECOND VIOLATION IS A FELONY PUNISH-
ABLE BY NOT LESS THAN SEVENTY-TWO HOURS IMPRISONMENT
AND NOT MORE THAN TWO YEARS, AND/OR A FINE OF UP TO
$2,000.
VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER OTHER THAN BY ABUSIVE BEHAV-
IOR IS CONTEMPT OF COURT AND PUNISHABLE IN ACCORDANCE
WITH LAW.
COMMENTARY: No comment.
(E) Non-Emergency Conditions: In those cases that do not present emer-
gency conditions, a hearing upon the petition shall be scheduled
within fourteen days after the petition for protection from abuse is
filed. If after the hearing the court is satisfied that allegations of
abuse have been proven by a preponderance of the evidence, a final
protection order shall be issued. 96
COMMENTARY: In some cases protection is needed but the dan-
ger of domestic abuse is not immediate. For example, the victim
recently may have moved to a different city and may fear that,
even if the abuser does not know where she is, he will eventually
find out and pursue her. The urgency of obtaining an order might
be reduced if the abuser is out of town for a period of time, or
if other circumstances indicate that immediate violence is un-
likely. If there is no emergency, other matters on the docket
need not be displaced in order to provide immediate relief.
(F) Emergency Jurisdiction
(1) When the courts thit handle protection orders in the locality
where the petitioner seeks relief are closed, the petitioner may apply
96 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 765(1) (1981).
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for ex parte relief to any available judge whose court has jurisdiction
to issue protection orders. Upon a showing that emergency condi-
tions exist, the court may order ex parte any relief authorized under
section 4.05.
(2) Any order issued under this section and any supporting docu-
mentation shall be forwarded immediately to the clerk of any
court selected by the petitioner that has jurisdiction and venue
in the action. Such action shall have the effect of commencing
proceedings under section 4.02.
(3) The respondent, upon being served with an order, may request
a hearing to show why the order should be dissolved or modified
pursuant to section 4.03(C). If a full evidentiary hearing is not
requested within twenty days after proof of service is filed, the
emergency order shall become a final order.
97
COMMENTARY: This section is addressed to situations of ex-
treme emergency. The Model Act provides for issuance of ex
parte orders at night and on weekends by any available judge,
either a judge on call for emergencies, or any judge who can be
reached if the jurisdiction has no emergency assignment rota-
tion. The section then establishes a procedure for transferring
papers to the appropriate court invoking the due process
procedures.
(G) Duration of Orders: Any final protection order issued under section
4.03 of this Act shall be effective for a fixed period of time not to
exceed twenty-four months, except that such order may be extended,




(H) Motions for Renewal, Extension, or Modification of Protection Orders
(1) A petitioner to whom a protection order has been issued may
by request motion that the order be renewed or extended for up
to twenty-four months, or that any terms of the order be mod-
ified to address unanticipated problems or changed circum-
stances. Hearings on such motions shall be scheduled within ten
days after proof of service on the respondent is filed. If emer-
gency circumstances are shown, motions shall be heard ex parte
the same day they are filed.
COMMENTARY: This section is addressed to two frequent prob-
lems. First, women are often battered the day after a protection
97 See id. § 765(3).
" Cf. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4 (III) (Supp. 1981).
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order expires. The victim may be in a good position to predict
the abuser's likely response to the expiration of the order and
may avoid the situation by asking for renewal or extension
before it expires.
Second, in many cases the parties' relationship continues after
a protection order is issued despite a long history of violence. 99
The issuance of an eviction order allows a temporary separation.
In some cases the parties decide that they would like to resume
cohabitation. To make clear that a protection order remains in
effect even if an eviction order is no longer observed, the court
should encourage parties in such circumstances to file a motion
for modification of the order. The order may be changed to
impose realistic restrictions to reduce the risk of injury to parties
who are in an ambivalent relationship and have a history of
violence. The judge cannot prohibit cohabitation even if there
has been serious violence, but the judge can indicate an asses-
ment of the risks involved by refusing to dissolve an order
prohibiting violence. Some couples are anxious to pretend that
there was never a breach between them; a continuing protection
order can be a useful reminder that the respondent has a re-
sponsibility to cease violent behavior.
(2) Proof. The court shall evaluate requests for renewal, extension
or modification using the same standards of proof imposed in
initial proceedings for protection orders. The petitioner may
request additional relief based on facts proven or admitted in
the original hearing.
(3) Effect of Reconciliation. Only the court can modify an order
issued under this Act and reconciliation of parties shall not affect
the validity of a protection order. 100
COMMENTARY: This section makes clear that consensual vio-
lation of part of a protection order does not void the entire
order. As discussed above, many victims of abuse separate from
their assailants for a period of time and then decide to resume
coresidence. Optimally, if the protection order requires that the
respondent vacate a residence shared with the victim, the order
should be modified to reflect a change in the parties' arrange-
ments. Where the parties agree to resume coresidence or contact
" Abused women who leave their abusers often seek help from a legal or social
service agency. Most return at least once after leaving because of reconciliation, fear
of reprisals, or other reasons. See D. MARTIN, supra note 50, at 73-76; L. WALKER,
supra note 26, at 65-70.
100 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4 (VI) (Supp. 1981).
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without requesting modification of a protection order, however,
the other provisions of the order should remain in effect and be
enforceable.
4.04. Hearings: Criminal Proceedings.
(A) Upon the filing of any criminal action involving domestic violence,
the prosecuting attorney shall request by motion that a protection
order be issued as a condition of pretrial release or diversion to
protect the complainant or others affected by the action and to
prevent the defendant from attempting to interfere with the pro-
ceedings by intimidating witnesses.
(B) Motions for protection orders in criminal cases shall use the form
provided at section 4.02(A)(5) of this statute.
(C) The procedures prescribed for obtaining a protection order in an
independent civil action shall be used in criminal proceedings. The
court may grant any relief described in section 4.05. The criminal
court may elect not to issue a final order regarding a request con-
cerning child custody, support, or involving personal property. In
such cases, the court may issue an interim order providing limited
relief and forward the petition to civil court for determination of
remaining issues.
(D) A protection order issued as a condition of pretrial release under
this section shall not be construed as a finding that the alleged
offender committed the alleged offense, and shall not be admissible
to prove commission of the offense charged.
(E) A protection order issued as a condition of pretrial release is effective
only until the disposition of the criminal complaint under which it
was filed. If the defendant is convicted of or pleads guilty to the
offense charged, a protection order may be issued as a condition of
probation or parole or included in any other disposition. 101
COMMENTARY: This section makes the protection orders avail-
able in civil proceedings available in criminal proceedings as
conditions of release, diversion, or as a condition of proba-
tion. 02 Battered women need the same protection from harm
when prosecution is initiated as they do absent criminal action;
the filing of charges affords no automatic protection to any crime
victim. The need for protection may be even greater during
criminal proceedings because of the threatening effect of pros-
ecution and the consequent risk of reprisals.
101 This section is influenced by the structure of the Ohio abuse law. See OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 2919.26(E) (Page Supp. 1982).
102 Id.
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Use of protective injunctions in criminal proceedings is com-
mon practice. As in domestic relations proceedings, orders re-
stricting the parties' conduct during the proceedings are fre-
quently issued, but they often are not put in writing and are
often issued without any consultation with the victim. Violations
of such orders are rarely penalized. This section strengthens
this long-established remedy.
The most important difference between protection orders in
civil and criminal court is the basis for the court's jurisdiction.
In a criminal proceeding, the court may require or prohibit
certain conduct during the pendency of criminal charges in order
to prevent intimidation of witnesses and to ensure orderly ad-
ministration of justice. If prosecution of the charge is deferred
based on the defendant's agreement to comply with certain
conditions, a protection order may be included as a condition
of deferral. If the defendant pleads guilty or is convicted, a
protection order may be issued as part of the defendant's sen-
tence. In civil court, the basis of the court's power is to settle
private conflicts between individuals.
Because the basis of jurisdiction in criminal court is related
to the pendency of charges or to post-conviction penalties, the
initial order must expire when the charge is disposed and a new
order must be issued. Although this procedure is complicated,
it is less complicated than requiring the petitioner to initiate a
separate court action to get protection.
The Model Act provides that all the relief available in civil
proceedings may be included in a criminal order. In many cases,
support, child custody, visitation, and property issues are inte-
grally related to the safety of victims of abuse. Visitation may
be used as an opportunity to abuse the victim again. 103 An award
of temporary custody would allow a woman to take her children
with her if she fled for safety to another city. Authority over
property issues would allow the court to require the abuser to
return the victim's car or credit cards to her.
Despite the relevance of these issues, some criminal judges
will not be comfortable ruling on such a broad range of issues.
To prevent judges from avoiding these problems by issuing nar-
row orders, the statute allows criminal court judges to issue
interim orders and to transfer protection order petitions to civil
judges for rulings on remaining issues.
I'3 See Thomas, supra note 70, for suggestions on how to structure visitation to protect
the safety of the victim.
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4.05. Available Relief. In both civil and criminal proceedings in which
petitions for protection orders are filed, the court shall grant relief that
is necessary to prevent further abuse. 1" 4 Final relief may include but
shall not be limited to ordering the following:
COMMENTARY: No comment.
(A) No Further Abuse: restraining the assailant from subjecting the
victim(s) to domestic violence, as defined in section 3.01; 105
COMMENTARY: No comment.
(B) Exclusive Possession: granting exclusive possession of the residence
or household to the petitioner or other resident regardless of whether
the residence is jointly or solely owned or leased by the parties or
others. 
06
COMMENTARY: Exclusive possession is the most important of
the listed remedies. It addresses the fundamental issue of who
should bear the expense and inconvenience resulting from the
violence between two people who live together. The provision,
in effect, creates for the victim the right to be safe at home.
Although the exclusion of a man from his own home may appear
to be a radical form of relief, the remedy has been authorized
in most states. 0 7 An order for exclusive possession is available
regardless of which party is named in the deed or lease. The
order, however, does not affect title to any property. 108
(C) Stay Away: ordering the respondent not to enter the residence,
school, or place of employment of the victim or other family or
household members of the victim'0 9 and to stay away from any
specified place that is frequented regularly by the victim or other
family or household members;
104 See PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10,186(a) (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1983).
"' See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.600(b)(I) (Supp. 1982); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§ I0,186(a)(1) (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1983).
06 See CAL. CIv. CODE § 4359(a)(3) (West 1983); see also ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.55.600(b)(2) (Supp. 1982); KANSAS STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(a)(2) (Supp. 1982).
107 See, e.g., Illinois Domestic Violence Act § 208(c)(2), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40,
§ 2302-8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3(c) (West
Supp. 1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(l)(b) (Page Supp. 1982). See generally
Lerman & Livingston, supra note 1, at 6 (identifying over forty states with provisions
for eviction orders). Some eviction provisions vary depending on whether the petitioner
must have an interest in the property or a right to support to be eligible to obtain an
order for exclusive possession. See, e.g., PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10,186(a)(2)-
(3) (Purdon Supp. 1983) (granting exclusive possession to petitioner where petitioner
has joint or sole interest in the residence or where respondent has sole interest in the
residence and owes petitioner a duty to support); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-13(b)(4)
(West 1982) (sole ownership of residence by respondent-spouse shall not bar a grant of
exclusive possession to the petitioner-spouse).
0 See infra text accompanying note 144.
i See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(g) (Page Supp. 1982).
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COMMENTARY: This remedy is intended to enable the victim to
move freely without encountering her assailant. An order under
the provision might be most effective if it included a list of the
addresses or localities that the defendant must avoid.
Including the victim's workplace is especially important. If
the victim has separated from the abuser, her safety, indepen-
dence, and ability to earn a living are all inextricably linked.
Abusers may harass their victims at work so frequently that the
victims may lose their jobs. This section addresses this specific
problem.
(D) No Communication: ordering the respondent to avoid any commu-
nication whatsoever, including personal, written, or telephone con-
tact, with the victim or others with whom communication would
create a danger that acts of domestic violence would be committed,
or specifying limited circumstances in which communication is
permissible;1o
COMMENTARY: No comment.
(E) Rent and Mortgage Payments: ordering a respondent to make or to
continue to make rent or mortgage payments on a residence occupied
by the victim if the respondent is found to have a duty to support
the victim or other dependent household members;
COMMENTARY: No comment.
(F) Alternative Housing: ordering the respondent to pay the victim's
rent at a residence other than the one previously shared by the
parties if the respondent is found to have a duty to support the
victim and the victim requests alternative housing;"'
COMMENTARY: In some cases, the victim must leave her resi-
dence to be safe from her assailant. The abuser, in such a case,
may be ordered to pay the rental expenses incurred by the victim
as a result of the alternative living arrangements. The subsection
provides that the payment of such rent shall be at the victim's
option.
(G) Nonadmission: recommending to the victim or other household
members that they not invite the respondent to the residence and
that they decline any request or demand to admit the respondent
1o Cf. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.600(b)(3) (Supp. 1982) (court may restrain respondent
from direct or indirect communications with petitioner).
"1 See Illinois Domestic Violence Act § 208(c)(2), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 2302-8
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(a)(3) (Supp. 1982). Cf. OHIO
Rav. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(c) (Page 1982) (respondent may provide alternative
housing through consent agreement).
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while an order evicting the respondent or requiring the respondent
to stay away from the residence of the victim is in effect;"
2
COMMENTARY: The court has no power to restrict the conduct
of the victim, unless the repondent files a petition against her.
The judge, in pursuit of an effective remedy for a violent situ-
ation, can recommend to the victim not to admit the respondent
if he appears at her residence after being ordered to stay away.
By issuing such an order, the judge may reduce the likelihood
that the respondent will try to persuade the petitioner to allow
him to violate the order.
(H) Payment of Support: ordering the respondent to pay for the support
of the victim or other dependent household members if the respon-
dent is found to have a duty to provide such support, and ordering
that payments be made through the court clerk if necessary;"
3
COMMENTARY: This provision, as well as those that follow, is
intended to provide comprehensive, short-term relief that will
give victims of abuse protection from and alternatives to living
in a chronically violent relationship. The provision allows the
petitioner to seek support payments for herself or for children.
The petitioner, however, has a higher burden of proof for ob-
taining relief under this provision than for obtaining other relief
under this section. She must establish not only that she or the
children are victims of domestic violence under section 3.02(A),
but also that the respondent owes her or the children a duty of
support. In the case of obtaining support for herself, a finding
that the respondent owes the petitioner a duty of support would
be established under applicable state law." 4 In the case of ob-
taining support for children, an uncontested allegation that the
respondent is the father of the children may be sufficient to
show respondent's duty of support." 5
A support award that is part of a protection order should not
be treated as a substitute for a more thorough inquiry into the
financial relationship between the parties but as a temporary
measure to provide emergency financial help to victims of abuse
who are extricating themselves from violent relationships. Nor
112 Cf. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(2) (Page 1980 & Supp. 1982) (court may
prohibit respondent from returning to residence and may prohibit petitioner from ad-
mitting respondent to residence).
"13 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(e) (Page 1980 & Supp. 1982).
14 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-916(b) (1981) (explaining duty to support spouse).
"5 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-916(c) (1981) (explaining duty to support children).
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should this section be used as a speedy alternative to a complaint
for divorce, separation, support, or custody.
(I) Temporary Custody and Visitation: granting temporary custody of
children to the victim upon a determination by the court that it has
jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act,"1
6
and specifying arrangements for visitation by the respondent and
requiring third-party supervision of visitation if necessary to protect
the victim or the children."l
7
(1) For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, if the petitioner
alleges that disclosure of the children's current address, pur-
suant to section 9 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act, would endanger the victim or the children, or would dis-
close the confidential address of a shelter for victims of domestic
violence, then such disclosure shall be made orally and in
camera. "18
(2) In determining temporary custody and visitation rights under
this section, the court shall presume that a person who has
committed an act or acts of domestic violence against any other
family member is unfit to be a custodial parent and that the best
interest of the children is served by an award of temporary
custody to the nonabusive parent. This presumption may be
rebutted by a showing of abuse or neglect of the children by the
nonabusive parent, or by a showing that the abusive parent is
the children's primary caretaker and is the more fit parent. If
the presumption is rebutted, the court may decline to award
custody as part of a protection order.
COMMENTARY: In addition to providing protection to children
who may be exposed to domestic violence, this section attempts
to prevent an abuser from using the custody of his children as
a bargaining chip to persuade his victim to remain in the rela-
tionship or to spend time with him. When a victim of abuse
separates from a violent mate or takes legal action to stop the
violence, the abuser often reacts by persuading or coercing the
victim to resume the relationship.11 9 In recent years, men in-
creasingly have resorted to snatching children from their mates
in an effort to persuade their mates to return to them. 20 Some
116 UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 111 (1979). See Illinois
Domestic Violence Act § 208(c)(3), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 2302-8 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1982).
117 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-13(b)(5) (West 1982).
"8 See National Center for Women and Family Law, Confidentiality of Address in
Custody Cases: A Needed Protection for Battered Women, THE WOMEN'S ADVOCATE,
Sept. 1982, at 4, 8.
"19 See generally D. MARTIN, supra note 50, at 72-79.
120 Cf. P. HOFF, J. SCHULMAN, A. VOLENKI & J. O'DANIEL, INTERSTATE CHILD
CUSTODY DISPUTES AND PARENTAL KIDNAPPING: POLICY, PRACTICE AND LAW 6-6 to
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men use their visitation rights with children as an excuse to see
their estranged mates. Because the relationship of the batterer
to the children is so integrally connected with the safety of the
victim, temporary custody and visitation arrangements must be
available as part of a protection order.
This section includes a presumption of the abusive party's
unfitness as a custodial parent for several reasons. First, men
who are violent toward one family member frequently become
violent toward others.12' Second, such a presumption makes it
more difficult for the abuser to use the law to obtain custody of
his children and thereby manipulate his victim into returning to
him. Finally, the presumption is needed to counteract the grow-
ing trend toward awards of joint and paternal custody. Even if
children are not victimized by the abuser, they are often aware
of the violence in the home and become fearful of the abuser.
In most cases, the parent who is not abusive is a better caretaker
and can provide a more stable environment for the children.1
22
Many courts, however, currently fail to recognize "primary
caretaker" as a critical determinant of a child's best interest and
instead award custody to the parent who is in a better financial
position to support the child. 23 These patterns often operate to
deprive women (including battered women) of custody of their
children. 1
24
(J) Monetary Compensation: ordering the respondent to pay the victim
or the petitioner monetary compensation for the losses suffered as
a direct result of the abuse, including but not limited to medical
expenses, loss of earnings or other support, cost of repair or re-
placement of real or personal property damaged or taken, moving
or other travel expenses, attorney's fees, and court costs;
25
COMMENTARY: This provision compensates the victim or the
petitioner for the immediate and tangible losses caused by acts
6-7, 15-8 to 15-9 (1982) (a manual discussing the need for increased lawyer awareness
of the dangers posed to victims of domestic abuse and their children as a result of
parental kidnapping).
" See Thomas, supra note 70.
122 See generally A. GANLEY, supra note 71, at 16.
121 See Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child
Custody Determinations, 7 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 235 (1982).
124 Presentations of Nancy Polikoff and JoAnne Schulman at the Fourteenth National
Conference on Women and the Law, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 8, 1983). See generally
Nat'l Center on Women and Family Law, Battered Women and Custody (Jan. 1983)
(unpublished materials available from the National Center on Women and Family Law,
799 Broadway, Room 402, New York, N.Y. 10003).
.-2 See Illinois Domestic Violence Act § 208(c)(8)-(9), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 2302-
8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982). But see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766(l)(I) (1981)
(limiting compensatory losses to loss of earnings or support, reasonable expenses in-
curred for personal injuries or property damage, and reasonable moving expenses).
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of domestic violence. Although a majority of states have abol-
ished interspousal immunity in personal injury actions, those
lawsuits are long and costly and therefore are not a realistic
option for most battered women. This section makes possible a
simple and expedient claim for damages.1
26
(K) Possession of Personal Property: ordering that the victim be given
temporary possession of specified personal property belonging to
either party such as automobiles, checkbooks, keys, and other per-
sonal effects;
127
COMMENTARY: Often violence in a close relationship represents
the desire of the batterer to control the victim. 28 Sometimes,
this quest for control is expressed not only through physical
abuse, but also through the appropriation of the victim's per-
sonal possessions, especially those items which give the victim
economic freedom or geographic mobility. 29 This section is de-
signed to preserve such freedom and mobility.
(L) Nondisposition of Property: prohibiting the respondent from trans-
ferring, encumbering, or otherwise disposing of specified property
mutually owned or leased by the parties;
130
COMMENTARY: No comment.
(M) Counseling: ordering the respondent to participate in a minimum
of sixty hours of a court-approved counseling program which is
designed specifically to help batterers stop violent behavior, and
requiring the respondent to provide the court at four-week intervals
with documentation of participation in such program;' 3
1
COMMENTARY: Court-mandated counseling for abusers has
been widely used in criminal proceedings. 32 Where the courts
have ordered counseling in civil cases involving domestic rela-
126 For a discussion of personal injury actions filed by women against abusive mates,
see Note, The Case for Legal Remedies for Abused Women, 6 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 135, 157-60 (1977).
127 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(a)(8) (Supp. 1982).
2 Russell and Rebecca Dobash explain that "the use of physical force against wives
should be seen as an attempt on the part of the husband to bring about a desired state
of affairs." R. DOBASH & R. DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES: A CASE AGAINST
THE PATRIARCHY 23-24 (1979); see A. GANLEY, supra note 71, at 16.
,19 The author has spoken with numerous battered women who have reported that
their mates appropriated wallets, checkbooks, credit cards, car keys, money in joint
checking accounts, automobiles, and other personal property.
130 See Illinois Domestic Violence Act § 208(c)(6), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 2302-8
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982).
'3' See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-11 (West 1982). See generally ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.55.600(b)(7) (Supp. 1982).
132 See generally L. LERMAN, supra note 4, at 91-115 (discussing various criminal
diversion programs for abusers).
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tions, they have traditionally referred parties to couples coun-
seling or family therapy, focusing on the preservation of the
marital relationship. Recent experience indicates that group
counseling for batterers is more likely to be an effective treat-
ment than counseling couples or individuals. 13 3 Careful tracking
of counseling orders is necessary to ensure that the orders will
be obeyed.
34
(N) Payment of Costs of Counseling: ordering the respondent to pay the
cost of counseling mandated under section 4.05(M) or the cost of
counseling for the victim, or other household members affected by
the violence;
COMMENTARY: In some places, public funding is available to
pay the costs of establishing a treatment program for abusers.
In most jurisdictions, however, the participants must absorb the
costs. "'35 If other family members seek counseling on issues
related to the abuse, that expense should be borne by the per-
petrator of the violence.
Under the Model Act, the court cannot order the victim to
undergo counseling; to allow the court to issue such orders
would imply victim responsibility for the violence. Victims of
abuse, however, may wish to seek counseling on their own. This
section makes counseling possible for victims who can not af-
ford to pay for therapy.
(0) Supervision of Return to Residence by Law Enforcement Offi-
cers: ordering that the protection order be served and executed by
law enforcement officers, or that law enforcement officers accom-
pany the victim to her residence to collect personal belongings, or
both; 3
6
COMMENTARY: Many police officers regard domestic violence
as fundamentally a civil matter and therefore outside their law
enforcement jurisdiction. 37 The section of the Model Act on
police duties requires that police supervise the return of the
victim to the residence to collect belongings and that officers
" See A. GANLEY, supra note 71, at 68-70.
"3 See generally A. GANLEY, supra note 71, at 89-91.
13 Iowa and North Dakota authorize government payment for counseling programs
but only if the parties are indigent. See IOWA CODE § 236.5(1) (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-07.1-02(4)(d) (1981). See generally Lerman & Livingston, supra note 1, at 12.
116 See generally D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(c)(9) (Supp. 1983) (authorizing the court
to order appropriate police action with regard to the issuance of the protective order).
3 See D. MARTIN, supra note 50, at 92-99. Martin quotes the former policy of the
police department of Oakland, Cal.: "The police role in a dispute situation is more often
that of a mediator and peacemaker than enforcer of the law." Id., at 93.
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supervise a respondent's departure from a residence when ex-
clusive possession has been granted to the petitioner. 3 8 These
functions may be specifically ordered as part of a protection
order; this enables the court to reinforce the mandate of the
law.
Police service and execution is particularly important when
an ex parte eviction order is issued because the respondent,
upon learning of such action, may become angry and need re-
straint. Police assistance may also be necessary when a victim
who has decided to move to another residence returns to her
original residence to collect personal belongings or children who
were left behind. It can be dangerous for a victim to confront
her abuser alone immediately after deciding to separate from
him. 139
(P) Payment of Shelter Expenses: ordering the respondent to pay a rea-
sonable fee for housing and other services that have been provided
or that are being provided to the victim by a shelter for victims of
domestic violence;
COMMENTARY: Most shelters for battered women and for run-
away children operate on minimal budgets and often have no
stable source of funds. The withdrawal of limited federal funds
from LEAA, CETA, Title XX, Community Development Block
Grants, and other programs, which had been available for bat-
tered women's shelters, has caused the closing of many such
shelters. 140 Alternative funding mechanisms are now being ex-
plored, including the use of revenue from surcharges on mar-
riage licenses or filing fees for divorce, or from fines imposed
on abusers convicted of crimes. 141 Since most shelter residents
are poor women, a fee-for-service arrangement is unlikely to
work. If the petitioner has been staying in a shelter as a result
3I See infra § 5.02.
139 According to Joan Kelly, a psychologist, many nonviolent couples experience an
incident of violence at the point of separation. Such violence may be the result of the
intense emotions that the individuals experience during that transition. Presentation by
Joan Kelly, Panel Discussion on Custody and Domestic Violence, Nat'l Women Judges
Ass'n Conference, San Francisco, Cal. (Oct. 8, 1983). For couples with histories of
violence, the risk of violence during separation may be even higher.
140 See Federal Budget Cuts Jeopardize Domestic Violence Programs: A National
Survey Report, RESPONSE, May-June 1983, at 1 (available from the Center for Women
Policy Studies, 2000 P St., N.W., Suite 508, Washington, D.C. 20036).
141See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 11-554(A)(16) (Supp. 1983) (surcharge imposed on
marriage licenses); IND. CODE § 4-23-17.5-4(b) (Supp. 1981) (surcharge on filing of an
action for dissolution of marriage); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 973.055(l)(a) (West Supp. 1982)
(surcharge of 10% of fine imposed for criminal violation of abuse laws).
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of the respondent's violence, then the respondent should pay
the costs of housing the petitioner in the shelter if he is finan-
cially able to do so.
(Q) Other Relief: granting any other requested relief necessary or ap-
propriate to prevent or reduce the likelihood of subsequent domestic
violence. 42
COMMENTARY: Section 4.05 provides an array of remedies that
address the typical problems for which a victim of abuse might
go to court for assistance. No list of this sort, however, could
be complete. Some abusers are strangely sadistic toward inti-
mates and engage in forms of cruelty which are unimaginable
to most of us. 143 Therefore, this section allows the victim to
fashion specific remedies for abuse that are not provided for in
the statute.
(R) Effect on Title: No order under this Act shall in any manner affect
title to any real property.' 44
COMMENTARY: No comment.
(S) Ex Parte Relief: Ex parte relief granted before the respondent is
notified and given an opportunity for a hearing may include (A) No
Further Abuse, (B) Exclusive Possession, (C) Stay Away, (D) No
Communication, (I) Temporary Custody and Visitation, (0) Police
Supervision of Return to Residence, and other relief necessary on
an emergency basis.
COMMENTARY: Only some of the relief allowed under section
4.05 is available as part of an ex parte order issued before the
abuser has received notice or had an opportunity to appear.
As a general rule, the necessities of the emergency determine
the appropriateness of issuing an order ex parte. Issues con-
nected with the immediate safety of the victim and her children
142 Cf. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §71.1 l(a)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1982) (court may prohibit
a party from doing specific acts or may require a party to do specific acts necessary or
appropriate to prevent or reduce the likelihood of family violence).
M Lenore Walker described the types of serious injuries that had been inflicted on
120 women whom she had interviewed:
Major physical assaults included: slaps and punches to the face and head;
kicking, stomping, and punching all over the body; choking to the point of
consciousness loss; punching and throwing across a room, down the stairs, or
against objects; severe shaking; arms twisted or broken; burns from irons,
cigarettes, and scalding liquids; injuries from thrown objects; forced shaving
of pubic hair; forced violent sexual acts; stabbing and mutilation with a variety
of objects, including knives and hatchets; and gunshot wounds.
L. WALKER, supra note 26, at 79.
' ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766(4) (1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-13(b)(4)
(Vest 1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(4) (Page 1980 & Supp. 1982).
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should be decided ex parte. Issues that can wait a week or two
should not be decided ex parte. In most cases, it would be
inappropriate to order support or compensation, to decide other
property issues, or to order counseling as part of an ex parte
order. These limitations, however, are intended only as
guidelines.
4.06. Notification and Service of Orders.
(A) The court shall order a law enforcement agency to serve the re-
spondent personally with a protection order issued pursuant to this
Act and to file proof of service with the clerk of the court by the
end of the next weekday after service is made. 45
(B) Within twenty-four hours of the issuance of a protection order, the
clerk of the court shall forward a copy of the order to the local law
enforcement agency with jurisdiction over the residence of the pe-
titioner, and to any other law enforcement agencies with jurisdiction
over the addresses listed in a stay away order.
46
(C) The clerk of the court shall issue, without fee, a copy of any pro-
tection order to the petitioner and the respondent.'
47
COMMENTARY: Service of protection orders on respondents has
been a chronic problem in implementing protection order
laws. 1 48 Law enforcement agencies often abdicate responsibility
for serving orders and insist that the petitioner pay a private
agency to perform the service.1 49 Some law enforcement agen-
cies charge fees to victims for the service of protection orders. 15 0
Service and enforcement of protection orders also may be dif-
ficult to obtain because some male law enforcement officers
may identify more readily with the male abuser than with the
female victim. I5 1
The most appropriate and available law enforcement agency
to handle service may vary from state to state. Yet personal
W See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766(6) (Supp. 1982).
146 Cf. MINN STAT. § 518B.01(13) (1980) (protection order forwarded to local agency
upon petitioner's request, and order made available to any other agency so needing it).
'47 See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.630 (Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 767
(1981).
'41 See generally Lerman, Civil Protection Orders: Obtaining Access to Court, RE-
SPON SE, Apr. 1980, at 1 (available from the Center for Women Policy Studies, 2000 P
St., N.W., Suite 508, Washington, D.C. 20036).
149 Id.
150 Id.
"I See Presentation by John Dean, District of Columbia Police Officer, at Baltimore
County Criminal Justice Conference on Domestic Violence, Towson, Md. (Mar. 29,
1983).
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service by a law enforcement officer is critical if the respondent
is to perceive the protection order as a serious matter.
To facilitate enforcement of protection orders, copies of all
orders should be provided to the petitioner, the respondent, and
the law enforcement agency most likely to respond to a call
regarding a violation of the order. Because the protection order
contains information about the respondent's previous assaults,
police officers who have copies of such orders may be better
prepared to encounter the respondent if called upon for enforce-
ment. Providing police with a copy of each protection order also
permits the officers to enforce the order even if the victim's
copy of the order has been lost or destroyed.
4.07. Violation of Protection Orders.
(A) A respondent who has received notice of a protection order issued
against the respondent and who violates the order by commission of
an act of domestic violence, as defined in section 3.01, is in contempt
of court and is subject to criminal charges, as defined in section
4.07(C) and as defined in the criminal code of this state.
(B) A respondent who has received notice of a protection order issued
against the respondent and who violates the order by conduct other
than domestic violence is in contempt of court.
(C) Commission of an act of domestic violence, as defined in section
3.01, in violation of a protection order is a misdemeanor of the first
degree, punishable by up to twelve months imprisonment or a fine
of up to $1000, or both.
(D) Commission of an act of domestic violence, as defined in section
3.01, in violation of a protection order by a person previously con-
victed under section 4.07(C) of a violation of a protection order is
a fourth degree felony, punishable by not less than seventy-two
consecutive hours of imprisonment. This offense may be punished
by up to two years imprisonment or a fine of up to $2000, or both.
The minimum sentence may not be suspended and probation or
parole may not be granted until the minimum sentence is served.
(E) Any violation of a protection order places the respondent in con-
tempt of court. 5 2 The court may require a respondent found in
contempt of court to remedy the violation in accordance with law.
(F) Upon finding probable cause that a respondent has violated a pro-
tection order by commission of an act of domestic violence, as
defined in section 3.01, the court shall, if the respondent has not
been arrested for the alleged violation, issue an arrest warrant and
,"See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-15(b) (West 1981).
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a summons requiring the respondent to appear for a hearing within
fourteen days at which the court shall determine whether the re-
spondent is guilty of the alleged violation.
(G) If the respondent is alleged to have violated a protection order by
conduct other than domestic violence, as defined in section 3.01, the
court shall issue a summons requiring the respondent to appear at
a hearing within fourteen days at which the court shall determine
whether the respondent has violated the order.
5 3
(H) Criminal violations of protection orders shall be prosecuted by the
city, county, or district attorney in criminal court.
(I) Any protection order issued under this section shall indicate in a
clear and conspicuous manner the consequences of violation of the
order. 
5 4
(J) Prosecution of a respondent for violation of a protection order shall
not preclude prosecution for other crimes arising out of the incident
in which the protection order is alleged to have been violated, but
all such charges shall be brought in one proceeding.
(K) Revenues collected from fines imposed for violation of protection
orders shall be deposited into a trust fund to be used to fund shelters
and other services for victims of domestic violence and treatment
programs for abusers.
155
COMMENTARY: Some jurisdictions treat the violation of a pro-
tection order as contempt of court, others treat it as a criminal
offense, while a third group treats some violations as criminal
offenses and other violations as contempt of court. 56 This Model
Act uses the last alternative primarily because some violations
involve acts that are criminal offenses under most state codes,
while other violations involve far less damaging misconduct.
To facilitate the enforcement of protection order laws, it is
important to prescribe penalties for violation of protection or-
ders within the domestic violence statute. It is also necessary
to tailor penalties and remedies to fit the particular violations.
A respondent may violate a protection order by committing a
serious assault or some other act that could be prosecuted. The
153 Cf. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:8 (Supp. 1981) (authorizing a court summons
for any violation of a protection order).
,-4 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766(3) (1981).
55 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30(4) (West Supp. 1983).
16 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(f) (1981) (violation of protection order
punishable as contempt); Illinois Domestic Violence Act § 212, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
40, § 2302-12 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982) (violation of protection order punishable as
contempt or misdemeanor); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.33 (West Supp. 1982) (violation of
protection order punishable as misdemeanor). See generally Lerman & Livingston,
supra note 1, at 8-9.
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Model Act provides for criminal prosecution of such violations.
To treat such violence as less than a criminal offense would
suggest that this conduct, when committed within an intimate
relationship, is less serious than when committed against a
stranger. Inclusion of criminal penalties for violation of protec-
tion orders puts respondents, law enforcement officials, and
others on notice that the statute contemplates serious enforce-
ment efforts.
In other cases, a respondent may violate a protection order
by failing to appear at a counseling session, by failing to pay
monetary compensation to the petitioner, or by committing
some other act which, while flaunting the order of the court,
might be inappropriate for criminal prosecution or a jail sen-
tence. This type of violation of a protection order should be
treated as a civil contempt of court, which may be remedied by
the issuance of additional court orders.
The penalties listed for criminal violations become increas-
ingly severe for repeat violations. In some cases, violence may
be deterred by issuance of an injunction; in other cases, it may
be deterred only by imposing a penalty. As a result, a respondent
who violates an initial protection order may take subsequent
orders more seriously because of the mandatory jail sentence
and felony charges attached to subsequent violations.
The Model Act states that prosecutors should handle criminal
violations. Existing abuse laws do not require this treatment,
and only in a few jurisdictions have prosecutors handled crim-
inal violations of protection orders. 157 Because of the confusion
about the quasi-criminal nature of most protection order laws,
some jurisdictions treat criminal violations as civil matters,
while in others civil courts impose criminal penalties without
the use of proper criminal procedures. To avoid this confusion,
this statute makes a clear distinction between civil contempt
violations and criminal violations and ensures that criminal vi-
olations of protection orders will be prosecuted by persons fa-
miliar with the protections accorded to criminal defendants.
4.08. Court Duties.
(A) The administrative offices of those courts that have jurisdiction to
issue protection orders shall maintain a record of all requests for
7 In Ventura County, Cal., for example, the District Attorney's Office participates
in obtaining and enforcing protection orders. See generally VENTURA COUNTY DIST.
A'rr'y, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER MANUAL (1981).
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orders pursuant to this Act. This record shall include the following
information:
(1) the names, genders, and relationship (blood relationship or liv-
ing arrangements) of the parties;
(2) the abuse alleged, whether the abuse alleged involved weapons
or resulted in injuries, and whether injuries inflicted required
medical attention; and
(3) the effective date and terms of each order issued.
(B) All case records maintained and names of parties shall be confiden-
tial and shall not be made available except as otherwise provided
by law.
(C) If practicable, the court administrative officer shall tabulate inci-
dence data using the information maintained pursuant to section
4.08(A). Parties shall not be identified in such tabulated data. Re-
ports generated from court records shall be submitted to the gov-
ernor, the state legislature, the state bureau of investigation, and
the state coalition of shelters for victims of domestic violence.
58 If
tabulation of data by an officer of the court is impracticable, other
persons wishing to prepare a report based on court records shall be
permitted access to those records but shall be required not to disclose
the identity of the parties named in the records.
COMMENTARY: Empirical data are useful in generating infor-
mation about the scope of the problem of domestic violence in
any community and in assessing the effectiveness of a legislative
scheme. In some states, the courts have access to a computer
system that would facilitate the maintenance and tabulation of
relatively detailed data. In other states, the police department
has access to such a system. The record-keeping requirements
imposed on the courts, like some of the other data collection
systems prescribed by the Model Act, are aspirational in nature.
The requirements are not intended for rote adoption by any
legislature. Instead, they should be considered by legislatures
to evaluate which types of data should be collected and
analyzed.
4.09. Applicable Rules of Procedure.
Except as otherwise stated in this chapter, hearings regarding the
issuance of protection orders and hearings on alleged civil violations of
orders shall be governed by the rules of civil procedure of this state.
Except as otherwise stated in this chapter, hearings on alleged criminal
,18 See generally N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-16 (West 1981) (providing for the mainte-
nance of similar records on petitions and orders and for the compilation of annual
reports based on such records).
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violations of this chapter shall be governed by the rules of criminal
procedure of this state.
COMMENTARY: No comment.
Section 5.00. LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE.
5.01. Duty to Respond to Calls for Assistance.
(A) Law enforcement agencies shall respond to every request for assis-
tance or protection, from or on behalf of a victim of alleged domestic
violence, whether or not a protection order has been issued against
the alleged abuser. 59
(B) Law enforcement agencies shall not assign lower priority to calls
involving alleged incidents of abuse or violation of protection orders
than is assigned in responding to like offenses involving strangers.
Existence of any of the following factors shall be interpreted by
police dispatchers as indicating a need for immediate response:
(1) the caller indicates that violence is imminent or in progress;
(2) a protection order is in effect; or
(3) the caller indicates that incidents of domestic violence have oc-
curred previously between the parties.
160
COMMENTARY: The prevalence of domestic abuse is caused in
part by underenforcement of the criminal law in domestic abuse
cases.' 6' Many police departments treat domestic violence as
the least important aspect of police work, 162 even though many
cases of domestic abuse involve the commission of violent
crimes that pose serious risks to the lives of the victims. It often
takes the police longer to respond to abuse calls than to other
types of calls; sometimes the police fail to appear at all, even
after urgent calls for help.1
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119 See WLDF AMENDMENTS, supra note 43, § 16-1006(b).
'6 See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.080(2) (Vernon Supp. 1983). The provisions on police
response are taken both from existing state laws and from consent decrees signed by
police departments in New York City, Oakland, Cal., and other cities where police have
been sued for failure to protect battered women. See Woods, Litigation on Behalf of
Battered Women, 5 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7, 27-28, 32 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Woods (1979)]. The language of the Model Act also reflects the concerns addressed in
an exhaustive analysis of police policy on domestic abuse. See generally N. LOVING,
RESPONDING TO SPOUSE ABUSE AND WIFE BEATING: A GUIDE FOR POLICE (1980)
[hereinafter cited as N. LOVING, A GUIDE FOR POLICE].
161 See generally R. DoBASH & R. DOBASH, supra note 128, at 207-22. One thesis of
this book is that wife abuse is perpetuated by inadequate response by institutions from
which abused women seek help.
16, See generally N. LOVING, A GUIDE FOR POLICE, supra note 160, at 4.
16 One study indicated that police did not respond to 17% of reported incidents of
domestic abuse. M. SCHULMAN. stwra note 16. at 40.
Domestic Abuse
Enforcement of the criminal law against those who victimize
their intimates is critical to the reduction of domestic abuse and
requires no substantive change in existing law.164 This section
merely restates the obligation of police officers to respond to
the scene of all "disturbance" calls that involve domestic vio-
lence as they respond to other calls for police assistance.165 This
statutory mandate encourages law enforcement officers to re-
spond more frequently and quickly to abuse calls and may pro-
vide battered women with a basis for negotiation with or liti-
gation against a police department whose practices fail to
conform to the law.
Subsection (B) lays out criteria for police dispatchers to use
in determining when calls involving domestic abuse need im-
mediate response. These criteria are spelled out to aid police
dispatchers in distinguishing disturbances that are routine in
nature from those requiring immediate response. The presence
of any one item on the list should result in the call's being
assigned emergency priority.
5.02. Duties of Police Officers Responding to Calls.
(A) Duties of Protection: If a police officer has any reason to believe that
a person is a victim of domestic violence, the officer shall use all
reasonable means to prevent further domestic violence and to ensure
the victim's safety, including:
(1) exercising arrest powers pursuant to section 5.03 of this Act;
(2) removing the offender from the household, if there is probable
cause to make an arrest and an arrest is not made, and if the
victim perceives continuing danger;
(3) attempting to persuade the offender to leave the household if
there is not probable cause to make an arrest and the victim
perceives continuing danger;
(4) filling out and filing a domestic violence offense report using
the form prescribed in section 5.05(B);
164 Fields, Wife Beating: Government Intervention Policies and Practices, in BAT-
TERED WOMEN: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY 228, 267 (1978).
165 Abuse calls generally are classified as "disturbance" calls and are accorded low
priority. Disturbance calls include a wide range of problems, some trivial and some
serious, from a call complaining of loud neighborhood noise to a woman's report that
her husband is outside her locked bedroom door with a loaded gun. The FBI defines
disturbance calls to include "family quarrels, man with gun calls, bar fights, etc." FBI,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS
KILLED AND ASSAULTED 41 (1982).
1984]
Harvard Journal on Legislation
(5) interviewing the parties in separate rooms to ensure that the
victim has an opportunity to speak freely;
(6) providing or arranging transportation for the victim to a safe
place or shelter if such transportation is desired;
(7) providing or arranging transportation for the victim to the
nearest hospital or medical facility for treatment of injuries if
such care is needed or desired;
(8) reading the victim the oral notice of rights to protection as
provided under section 5.02(B) and written information about
the nearest shelter or other agency providing service to victims
of domestic violence;
(9) advising the victim of the importance of preserving evidence
and of the types of evidence that should be preserved;
(10) taking photographs of any visible injuries or property damage
whenever necessary or appropriate;
(11) remaining on the scene of an incident of domestic violence as
long as the victim remains in danger;
(12) accompanying the victim to a previous residence to remove
personal belongings; and
(13) supervising the court-ordered removal of an abuser from a
residence shared with a victim.
166
COMMENTARY: Subsection (A) imposes thirteen specific duties
under the general mandate requiring the police to protect victims
of domestic violence. The statute uses the word "shall" in de-
scribing the duties of the police. Thus, the police officer is
required to take the measures listed to protect the victim, and
the victim may sue the police department if this statutory duty
is violated. 167
This section requires the police officer to exercise his or her
arrest powers pursuant to section 5.03. Depending upon which
alternative is adopted under section 5.03(A), the officer's arrest
power may be mandatory or permissive. Although many state
legislators may be reluctant to remove police discretion not to
make arrests, a recent study by the Police Foundation indicated
that reincidence of violence is less likely if the police arrest an
166 See generally Illinois Domestic Violence Act § 304(a), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40,
§ 2303-4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 6 (West Supp.
1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-8(2) (Supp. 1981); WLDF AMENDMENTS, supra note
43, § 16-1006(c).
167 The Oregon Supreme Court recently held that a victim injured as a result of an
officer's failure to fulfill his duty to arrest (as determined by statute) may sue the police
department for damages. Nearing v. Weaver, 295 Or. 702 (1983).
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abuser than if they separate the parties or mediate the
"dispute."168
The duty to remove the offender from the household under
certain circumstances is an extension of the traditional police
response to wife abuse, which was to walk the offender around
the block. The section contemplates that the officer might per-
suade the abuser to move to another place of lodging for the
night and that the officer would accompany the abuser to the
place chosen. The final decision on appropriate action, however,
is left to the officer rather than to the victim, because some
victims are unaware of or unable to express their need for
protection. In some circumstances, the officer should act to
protect a victim of abuse even over her own objection.
The requirement that incident reports be filed simply restates
an existing duty of police officers that is generally ignored in
practice. One survey of police officers found that thirteen per-
cent of those interviewed said that they did not write reports in
family disturbances, while seventy percent said that they com-
pleted written reports on between one to four incidents out of
twenty.169 Filing a report creates a useful record when a police
department receives subsequent calls from the same residence.
It also may be used to verify the parties' accounts of an abusive
incident when a case goes to court.
"6 The Police Foundation study focused on whether police should use law enforce-
ment procedures or social work techniques in responding to disturbance calls. It was
designed to determine through an experiment using real cases whether arrest, informal
mediation, or temporary separation of the parties was most effective in deterring sub-
sequent assault.
The participating officers were divided into three groups. Each officer responded to
a sample of actual wife abuse cases according to the instructions the officer's group had
been given. One-third of the officers made arrests, one-third separated the parties, and
one-third mediated the disputes.
A six-month follow-up study found that there had been a recurrence of violence in
24 percent of the cases in which the police had separated the parties for eight hours, a
17 percent recurrence in cases which were mediated, and only a 10 percent reincidence
of violence in cases in which an arrest was made. The researchers found that the data
on arrest and separation was statistically significant and the data on mediation was close
to being statistically significant.
The study revealed the dramatic deterrent effect of arrest on domestic abuse compared
to the effect of other, more common police responses to abuse cases. As of 1977, 70%
of police departments with 100 or more officers trained their officers to use mediation
rather than arrest in abuse cases. The Police Foundation study may lead to a major
shift in police policy away from "crisis intervention" (or mediation) and toward more
traditional law enforcement. L. Sherman & L. Berk, Police Responses to Domestic
Assault: Preliminary Findings (1983) (unpublished manuscript available from the Police
Foundation, Washington, D.C.).
169 CRIMINAL JUSTICE EVALUATION UNIT, SAN DIEGO ASS'N OF GOV'TS, EVALUA-
TION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE SAN DIEGO REGION 5 (1981).
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Clauses (5) through (11) are common sense forms of assistance
that battered women can receive from police officers who arrive
at a residence during or immediately following a battering inci-
dent. Some police departments have improved their policies
regarding response to domestic violence as a result of internal
policy changes, 70 while others have done so as a result of
litigation' 7' or the enactment of new legislation.
72
Clause (12) requires police officers to accompany victims who
request assistance in retrieving personal belongings from resi-
dences that they are temporarily or permanently leaving. These
situations may involve extreme danger to victims, because bat-
terers often become violent when their mates attempt to sepa-
rate from them. 1
73
Finally, the section requires police officers to supervise court-
ordered evictions of domestic abusers for the reasons explained
in the commentary to section 4.05(0).
(B) Requirements of Notice:
(1) In giving notice to a victim of the victim's rights as provided in
section 5.02(A)(8), the officer shall read the following statement
aloud and provide the victim with a card bearing the same
information: My name is Officer ; my badge
number is . The law requires that I offer the
following services to persons such as yourself who are victims
of domestic violence:
(a) if a crime has been committed against you, I must arrest
the suspect immediately, or I must remove the suspect from
the household or try to persuade him to leave the household;
(b) I must drive you or help you find transportation to the
nearest hospital or medical facility for treatment of injuries
if you need or want treatment;
(c) if you want to leave the residence, I must drive you or help
you find transportation to the nearest shelter for victims of
domestic violence or to any other nearby place where your
safety will be assured; and
170 See, e.g., Philadelphia Police Department Directive 90, Protection from Abuse
(Nov. 15, 1983).
171 See Woods, Litigation on Behalf of Battered Women, 7 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP.
39, 39-40 (1981) (discussing changes in police practices in New York City, Oakland,
Cal., and other cities) (this article is an updated version of the Woods (1979) article
cited supra note 160).
17. See, e.g., Illinois Domestic Violence Act § 304(a), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 2303-
4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 6 (West Supp. 1982);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-8(2) (Supp. 1981).
173 See supra note 139.
1984] Domestic Abuse 125
(d) I must make all reasonable efforts to make sure that you
are safe.
(2) In addition, the officer shall give the victim a written copy of
the following statement in English, Spanish, or any other lan-
guage commonly used in the community:
(a) The law provides that you may seek a court order prohib-
iting further abuse of yourself, your children, or anyone in
your household, if you are affected by the abuse or if the
victim is unable to seek help. You do not need to hire a
lawyer to get a protection order.
(b) The protection order may order the person who abused you
to move out of the residence where you live, to pay your
rent there or elsewhere, or to pay support for you or your
children. The order may give you custody of your children.
It may order the abuser to stay away from your workplace
or other places you regularly go. The order may require the
abuser not to call you or write you letters. It may order the
abuser to pay -your medical bills or to participate in coun-
seling. You may request any or all of these things, or ask
for other protection, as part of a protection order.
(c) To'get a protection order, go to room number __ at the
courthouse, which is located at . Ask the
clerk of the court for protection order forms. If you are in
immediate danger you usually can get an order the day you
file the petition.
(d) If the person who assaulted you violates this order, that
person may be arrested and punished or required to remedy
the violation.
(e) You also have the right to request that the prosecutor file a
criminal complaint against the person who assaulted you. If
convicted of a crime, the abuser may be placed on probation
and ordered to see a counselor, or the abuser may be put
in jail or fined.
(f) On nights, weekends, and holidays, when the courts are
closed, you may obtain emergency assistance by calling the
police or by calling to find a judge. 74
COMMENTARY: This section requires that victims be given no-
tice of their rights under the law. Notice provisions of this sort
appear only in a relatively small number of states, but are in-
cluded in many of the newer laws.175 The Model Act requires
'74 See ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.520 (Supp. 1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A,
§ 6 (West 1982).
175 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.520 (Supp. 1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
209A, § 6 (West 1982). See generally Lerman & Livingston, supra note 1, at 10-11.
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officers to read aloud a short notice to ensure that the victim
will receive information about her right to police protection
while the officer is present. Also, reading the notice aloud will
remind officers of their statutory duties under the law. The
police officers must also provide the information contained in
the oral notice to the victim in writing.
As a practical matter, it is necessary that the oral notice be
brief and include only information that is immediately relevant.
The police department, however, is often the first and only
agency that a victim of abuse contacts. Therefore, officers have
a responsibility to educate the victim about what legal remedies
for abuse are available. Hence, the statute requires police offi-
cers to provide the victim with written information about the
remedies available to her under the law.
5.03. Arrest Powers of Police Officers Responding to Domestic
Violence Calls.
Alternative 1
(A) A police officer shall make an arrest without a warrant if:
(1) the officer has probable cause to believe that a misdemeanor or
felony involving domestic violence, as defined in section 3.01,
has been committed by the suspect in violation of a protection
order or in violation of any criminal statute of this state; and
(2) the suspect is present at the scene when the police arrive or the
suspect can be located. Such arrest shall be made whether or
not the offense was committed in the presence of the officer. 76
Alternative 2
(A) A police officer may make an arrest without a warrant if the officer
has probable cause to believe:
(1) that the suspect has committed a felony;
(2) that the suspect has committed a misdemeanor involving do-
mestic violence, as defined in section 3.01;
(3) that the suspect has committed a misdemeanor and the officer
j76 See generally OR. REV. STAT. §§ 133.055(2), 133.310(3) (1981) (providing that a
police officer may make a warrantless arrest based on probable cause that a misde-
meanor has been committed and that an officer must make a warrantless arrest if the
officer has probable cause to believe that a protection order has been violated); WLDF
AMENDMENTS, supra note 43, § 16-1006(d) (imposing on the officer a duty to arrest
unless the complainant objects to the arrest).
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has reason to believe that the suspect presents a continuing
danger if he or she is not immediately arrested; or
(4) that the suspect has committed a misdemeanor in the presence
of the officer.1
77
COMMENTARY: At present very few abuse calls lead to arrest. 7
Police must arrest more wife abusers to inform communities
that such conduct will not be tolerated. Without the exercise of
police power on behalf of battered women, court orders become
empty threats. Without immediate arrest, the likelihood of any
successful criminal prosecution decreases.
Statutory changes are necessary in most states to allow police
to make warrantless arrests for serious domestic assaults.
79
Most police perceive criminal conduct in domestic cases as
misdemeanors, and arrest laws frequently require that a warrant
be obtained in order to make an arrest for a misdemeanor com-
mitted out of the officer's presence. 80 In addition, serious in-
juries often are not apparent to officers who arrive immediately
after an assault; bruises may not appear for a few hours, and
injuries may be internal or concealed by clothing.
Subsection (A) is presented in two versions. The first imposes
upon police officers a duty to arrest in all domestic abuse cases
in which probable cause is present. The section abolishes the
in-presence requirement and allows arrest even if a protection
order has not been issued. This provision clearly states the
policy that arrest is the appropriate response when a crime of
domestic violence is committed.
The second alternative, which retains the police officer's dis-
cretionary authority to arrest, may be a necessary compromise
in some states for two reasons. First, some legislators may be
unwilling to make substantial changes in the arrest laws as they
are currently written. Alternative 2 uses a structure similar to
7 See generally Illinois Domestic Violence Act § 301, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 2303-
1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982).
7" In Cleveland, Ohio, during nine months in 1979, police made only 460 arrests in
responding to domestic disturbance calls, despite a new law allowing warrantless arrests
for misdemeanor spousal assault. See OHIO ATT'y GEN., THE OHIO REPORT ON Do-
MESTIC VIOLENCE 1979, 71. The Attorney General's report listed the number of arrests
made, as well as the number of official reports filed (700). The report, however, did not
list the number of disturbance calls made to the police, which for that period was
estimated at 15,000. Interview with Grace Kilbane, Director of the Cleveland Witness/
Victim Assistance Program, in Cleveland (Jan. 15, 1981).
179 See generally Lerman, Expansion of Arrest Powers: A Key to Effective Interven-
tion, 7 VT. L. REV. 59, 63-64 (1982).
110 For a more complete explanation of this issue, see id. at 59, 63-67
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some existing statutory language on warrantless arrest and
therefore does not dramatically alter the current law.' 8' Second,
many state legislators may be unwilling to impose a duty to
arrest on the police. The law is likely to be less effective if the
language is permissive, 82 but such language is preferable to
retaining the in-presence requirement for misdemeanors.
It is not clear whether there is a meaningful distinction be-
tween permissive and mandatory language. 83 If permissive sta-
tutory language is interpreted to impose a duty to arrest, victims
of abuse may have a legal remedy against police departments
whose officers fail to make the necessary arrests.
(B) Determination of Probable Cause.
(1) Any clear and specific written statement by a person alleging
the commission of domestic violence against that person or al-
leging that he or she witnessed an act of domestic violence
against another constitutes probable cause for an officer to be-
lieve that the offense was committed and probable cause to
believe that the suspect committed the offense.
84
(2) In the absence of such a statement, the officer shall consider the
following factors in determining whether probable cause exists:
(a) whether a victim or a witness alleges that an incident of
domestic violence occurred;
(b) whether there are visible injuries, torn clothing, disruption
of physical surroundings, or other physical evidence of do-
mestic violence; and
(c) whether the dispatcher indicated a report of imminent vio-
lence or violence in progress. 85
(3) The existence of any of the following circumstances shall not be
considered in any determination of probable cause to believe
that a crime was committed by a person alleged to have com-
mitted it:
(a) that the victim knows the accused;
(b) that the victim has not made efforts to obtain a divorce or
a protection order or to flee the residence;
(c) that the officer believes that the victim will not pursue crim-
,81 See, e.g., Illinois Domestic Violence Act § 301, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 2303-1
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982).
Woods (1979), supra note 160, at 28-29.
z' See generally A. M. BOYLAN & N. TAUB, ADULT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: CONSTI-
TUTIONAL, LEGISLATIVE AND EQUITABLE ISSUES 235 (1980) (discussing how permissive
language has sometimes been interpreted so as to require affirmative action).
184 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.03(B) (Page 1982).
'" See generally WLDF AMENDMENTS, supra note 43, § 16-1006(e).
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inal prosecution, or that the prosecutor will refuse to file
charges based on the alleged incident;
(d) that the officer believes that reconciliation is preferable to
arrest;
(e) that there are no witnesses to the incident;
(f) that the suspect is not in an agitated or argumentative state;
or
(g) that the victim has called the police on previous occasions.
86
COMMENTARY: The states may define the scope of police power
to arrest so long as the statute does not abolish the constitutional
requirement of probable cause. 187 In some jurisdictions, legis-
lation or police directives specify the circumstances under which
an officer might find probable cause.'88 These directives may
foster more uniform police conduct and may narrow the subjec-
tive judgment that is necessarily a part of any decision to take
a suspect into custody.
Subsection (B)(1) is an adaptation of the definition of the
probable cause requirement in the Ohio abuse law. 189 It states
that an officer may make an arrest based solely on the statement
of the alleged victim that a crime has been committed against
her by the alleged assailant or on the statement of a witness that
a crime has been committed against someone else. 190 Abusers
frequently deny that any incident occurred, and police officers
must decide which party, the victim or the assailant, is more
credible. This section aids in that assessment.
It is possible that a few improper arrests would be made using
these guidelines. In general, however, police will not make an
arrest if they do not believe a crime has been committed, and
it is unlikely that the victim's words would be the sole basis of
that assessment.
Drafters should be cautious about including this provision in
a law that uses mandatory arrest language; the combination of
186 See generally id. § 16-1006(f).
187 Probable cause means that the arresting officer must have "reasonably trustworthy
information" in light of any "facts and circumstances" that would lead a reasonably
cautious person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed. Draper v.
United States, 358 U.S. 307, 318 (1959).
188 See N. LOVING, A GUIDE FOR POLICE, supra note 160, at 163 app. (order resulting
from consent agreement of Oakland Police Department).
8 See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.03(B) (Page 1982).
,90 According to a recent Supreme Court decision, the "totality of the circumstances"
would in the end determine if the sole statement by the victim is sufficient to establish
probable cause. See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
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the two would impose a duty of arrest whenever a person signed
a statement alleging that he or she or someone else had been
abused.
Subsection (B)(2) lists factors that would favor a finding of
probable cause. Subsection (B)(3) lists factors that are not to be
included in an officer's judgment about whether to make an
arrest. It is adapted from consent judgments in lawsuits against
the police departments of Oakland, California, and New York
City. 191 It is intended to negate the reasons most often offered
by police officers to explain why arrests are avoided in domestic
abuse cases.
5.04. Limitation of Liability.
Law enforcement agencies and officers shall not be liable for personal
injuries or property damage that occurs in the course of any good-faith
effort to protect a victim of domestic violence, including but not limited
to action taken during the course of an arrest, an attempt to separate
the parties or to enforce a court order, or action taken during the
transportation of the victim to a shelter, hospital, or other authorized
place.' 92
COMMENTARY: This section is intended to encourage zealous
enforcement of the law by police officers by shielding them to
some extent from lawsuits by persons against whom the laws
are enforced. Police have expressed concern that, as a result of
implementing new domestic violence laws, they will be deluged
with litigation brought by irate husbands. Under the Model Act,
police are protected from civil liability for damages if the injury
to the abuser resulted from a good-faith effort to enforce the
law.
Many states have included similar language in their abuse
laws to encourage police support for a proposed law that im-
poses new duties on police officers. 193 This immunity clause,
however, does not (and could not) prohibit suits for violations
of the federal civil rights laws. 194
191 For the orders and guidelines issued by the two police departments as a result of
the consent agreements, see N. LOVING, A GUIDE FOR POLICE, supra note 160, at 163-
68 app. The agreements resulted from the following two cases: Scott v. Hart, No. C76-
2395 (N.D. Cal. filed Nov. 9, 1979), and Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d
974 (Sup. Ct. 1977), rev'd, 64 A.D.2d 582, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d
582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979) (subsequent history of Bruno not affecting
the consent agreement entered into by the police department).
192 See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:I1 (Supp. 1981).
193 See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(L) (Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 14-4-104 (Supp. 1982); Illinois Domestic Violence Act § 305, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40,
§ 2303-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982).
194 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
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5.05. Reporting and Data Collection by Law Enforcement Agencies.
(A) Law enforcement agencies shall maintain complete and systematic
records of all protection orders in effect. The agencies shall use the
records to inform dispatchers and law enforcement officers respond-
ing to domestic violence calls of the existence, terms, and effective
dates of protection orders in effect as well as of prior incidents of
domestic violence.1
9 5
(B) The state bureau of investigation shall develop a domestic violence
offense report form that shall include but not be limited to the
following information:
(1) the names, addresses, ages, races, genders, occupations, and
relationship of the parties, and whether the victim was preg-
nant at the time of the incident;
(2) the time the complaint was received and the times the officer
responded to the call and left the scene of the incident;
(3) a detailed description of the incident that led to the call, in-
cluding the nature and extent of the alleged acts of violence;
(4) a detailed description of the injuries inflicted, including pho-
tographs of visible injuries;
(5) the number and type of weapons involved;
(6) the effective date and terms of any protection order in effect;
(7) a summary of the victim's account of the frequency and severity
of prior incidents of abuse, calls to the police, and prior court
action;
(8) all action taken by the responding officers to protect the victim
or to prevent subsequent violence;
(9) if no arrest was made, the reason for failure to make an arrest;
(10) a list of names, addresses, and statements of any witnesses to
the abuse, including a summary of statements of witnesses to
the incident; and
(11) any other information necessary for a complete analysis of the
incident. 196
(C) Within ten days following a call concerning an incident of domestic
violence, the police department shall forward a copy of the com-
pleted incident report to the prosecutor's office. 197
(D) The state bureau of investigation shall tabulate annually, by county
1' See Illinois Domestic Violence Act § 302(b), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 2303-2
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982).
196 See generally Illinois Domestic Violence Act § 303(a), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40,
§ 2303-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-8 (West 1982).
'97 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99.030(5) (Supp. 1983).
1984]
Harvard Journal on Legislation
and by metropolitan area, the data from domestic violence offense
reports and shall present a report of such data to the governor, the
state legislature, the administrative officer of the courts, and the
state coalition of shelters for victims of domestic violence. The report
shall include but not be limited to the following information:
(1) the total number of domestic violence calls received, by cate-
gory of classification;
(2) the number of calls received broken down by the sex, age,
relationship, and race of victims and of abusers;
(3) the number of cases in which weapons were used or in which
visible injuries were inflicted;
(4) the number of cases in which the victim was pregnant at the
time of abuse;
(5) a breakdown of cases according to the number of times victims
called the police or sought help in court;
(6) the number of reports filed by police;
(7) the number of arrests made;
(8) the number of cases in which criminal charges were filed, and
a breakdown of the types of charges filed;
(9) the reasons commonly reported by police for failure to make
arrests;
(10) the number of cases in which police officers removed one party
from the residence in lieu of arrest and the number of cases in
which police officers provided victims with transportation to a
hospital or shelter; and
(11) the average amount of time between a call to the police de-
partment and the arrival of police officers at the scene of the
incident. 198
COMMENTARY: This is the most important data collection sec-
tion included in the Model Act. Advocates, police officers, pros-
ecutors, and courts may use the information generated by rec-
ordkeeping to prevent subsequent abuse. While the individual
information may be useful in particular court proceedings, the
tabulated data increase police accountability and aid in social
policymaking on domestic violence. Moreover, the police de-
partment can implement most easily the statute's recordkeeping
provision, since police officers have more contact with battered
women than do members of any other official agency. The type
of recordkeeping contemplated by the statute requires only mod-
"' See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-8(c) (West 1982).
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erate adaptations of the data collection systems existing in most
police departments. 199
Subsection (A) requires each agency to keep current records
of the protection orders in effect in their precinct and to provide
the information to officers responding to calls. Such information
is essential to the enforcement of protection orders. Police might
otherwise refuse to enforce protection orders unless the victims
have certified copies of the orders available. This section would
prevent this practice.
Subsection (B) contemplates the development of a report form
for domestic violence offenses. In some states, it may be pos-
sible to use the state's existing general report forms with only
minor revisions. The domestic abuse reports, however, must be
easily identifiable to facilitate the tabulation of data contem-
plated by this section.
The Model Act requires that the police department transmit
copies of all incident reports in abuse cases to the prosecutor's
office, regardless of whether an arrest was made. Prosecutors
then may screen the reports and contact victims if an incident
appears to warrant prosecution. This arrangement has been ef-
fective in some jurisdictions2°° and responds to a common com-
plaint of prosecutors that they cannot file charges in abuse cases
because they are rarely notified of incidents.
The information to be compiled under subsection (D) is
adapted from the system used in Ohio, where the state Attorney
General's Office produces an annual report of all the tabulated
data. This report provides information on how the law is being
enforced and facilitates the comparison of institutional behavior
in different cities. 201
5.06. Training of Police Officers.
(A) Law enforcement agencies shall establish an education and training
program for police officers designed to acquaint them with:
(1) the nature, extent, and causes of domestic violence;
(2) the legal rights of and remedies available to victims of domestic
violence;
19 Most police departments participate in the recordkeeping requirements imposed
by the FBI Uniform Crime Reports. The Model Act would require adding only a few
lines to the forms already in use.
2w0 See L. LERMAN, supra note 4, at 38-39 (identifying Seattle, Wash., and West-
chester Co., N.Y.).
201 See, e.g., OHIO ATT'y GEN., supra note 178, at 70-71.
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(3) the services and facilities available to victims and batterers;
(4) the legal duties imposed on police officers to make arrests and
to offer protection and assistance; and
(5) techniques for handling incidents of domestic violence that min-
imize the likelihood of injury to the officer and promote the
safety of the victim.
20 2
(B) Training shall stress the enforcement of criminal law in domestic
violence cases and the use of community resources. Law enforcement
agencies and community organizations shall cooperate in all aspects
of the training. Representatives of shelters or other community
groups shall be invited to assist in planning and presentation of
training.20 3
(C) Basic training completed by police officers prior to permanent ap-
pointment shall include no less than twenty hours of training in




(D) Advanced eight-hour in-service training programs for all veteran
officers shall include sessions on responding to domestic violence
calls. The primary purpose of these sessions will be to familiarize
officers with this Act and any subsequent legislation on the protec-
tion of victims of domestic violence.
2 0 5
COMMENTARY: This section reverses a longstanding tradition
of providing limited or inappropriate training to recruits and
veteran officers on the handling of domestic violence calls.20 6
The need for more extensive training is evident. Many depart-
ments report that about one-third of police time is spent re-
sponding to calls involving domestic abuse. 20 7 More officers are
injured responding to disturbance calls than any other type of
call.20 8
The statute contemplates twenty hours of training for recruits
and periodic in-service training for veterans. The statute is quite
general but indicates specific subject areas that should be cov-
'02 See generally ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.510(a) (1981); WLDF AMENDMENTS, supra
note 43, § 16-1006(i); N. LOVING, A GUIDE FOR POLICE, supra note 160, at 113-27.
203 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-4 (West 1982).
20o See N. LOVING, A GUIDE FOR POLICE, supra note 160, at 122. See generally OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 109.73(4)(5) (Page Supp. 1982) (providing for 15 hours of training).
203 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.73(6) (Page Supp. 1982).
206 For a discussion of traditional police policies in abuse cases, see Note, supra note
126, at 144-49.
207 O'Reilly, Wife Beating: The Silent Crime, TIME, Sept. 5, 1983, at 23.
2 0 In 1982, the FBI reported that 34% of officers assaulted while on duty were
responding to "disturbance" calls. FBI, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 165, at 41.
The homicide data in the same report breaks down disturbances into two categories,
"domestic disturbances" and "other disturbances," and found that of ninety-two officers
killed, only seven, or eight percent of the total, were killed while responding to domestic
disturbance calls. Id. at 17.
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ered. The training should focus on law enforcement rather than
on crisis intervention, which dominates much of current police
training on abuse.2 9 The mediation approach involves teaching
police officers communication skills that enable the officers to
defuse a dispute. These skills are necessary to good police work,
but the emphasis on interpersonal skills in domestic situations
promotes the notion that the primary task in responding to an
abuse call is to mediate rather than to protect the victim from
abuse. Optimally, police trainers should focus on law enforce-




6.01. Definition. Diversion is a procedure that defers prosecution,
conviction, or sentencing of a criminal defendant under this Act pending
the defendant's voluntary completion of a program designed to prevent
further violence or other criminal conduct. Successful completion of a
diversion program will result in dismissal of criminal charges.
COMMENTARY: This section of the statute recommends a pro-
secutorial option that may be established either by statute or by
internal policy in a prosecutor's office. Advocates for battered
women disagree about the desirability of diversion. Some ad-
vocates believe that diversion sanctions the underenforcement
of the criminal law. These advocates therefore prefer that crim-
inal defendants in abuse cases be prosecuted and punished.2
Some offices that have established diversion programs, how-
ever, find that diversion can be effective in stopping violence.
212
It is also argued that diversion is more responsive to the objec-
tives of battered women who become criminal complainants,
because the victim's primary goal in most criminal abuse cases
is to stop the violence rather than to punish the offender. Abu-
sers who participate in diversion programs are often more
closely monitored than other defendants convicted of abuse
charges, and the conditions of diversion are often tailored to
the goal of stopping violence.
209 See generally N. LOVING, A GUIDE FOR POLICE, supra note 160, at 33-38.
210 For an example of a lesson plan which encourages a stronge law enforcement
policy, see N. LOVING, SPOUSE ABUSE: A CURRICULUM GUIDE FOR POLICE TRAINERS
(1981).
211 See generally U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 17, at 61-76.
22 L. LERMAN, supra note 4, at 110 (discussing the findings of statistical studies and
of participants in an LEAA-sponsored conference on programs for men who batter).
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Finally, diversion of defendants charged with domestic abuse
may drastically reduce case attrition. According to most pros-
ecutors, victim withdrawal from participation is the chief obsta-
cle to successful prosecution.213 Diversion avoids this problem
because the initial "disposition" of the case occurs immediately
after charges are filed and because the abuser enters diversion
voluntarily.
Diversion procedures place the suspect in a closely monitored
counseling program in which the primary goal is to stop vio-
lence. The accused batterer enters the program without prior
conviction; therefore, careful attention was given to the protec-
tion of participants' constitutional rights. The guidelines also
provide for the protection of the victim through the issuance of
a protection order during the period of diversion.
6.02. Eligibility Requirements.
(A) The prosecuting attorney shall screen all cases involving allegations
of domestic violence, as defined in section 3.01, to determine the
defendant's eligibility to participate in a diversion program.
(B) The defendant may be diverted only if:
(1) the defendant voluntarily agrees to participate in the program;
(2) the victim consents to the defendant's participation in the div-
ersion program during a consultation out of the defendant's
presence;
(3) a protection order is issued to prevent abuse during the period
of diversion;
(4) the defendant has not been convicted of any offense involving
violence during the seven years preceeding the current charge;
(5) the defendant's record does not indicate that probation or parole
has ever been revoked;
(6) the defendant has not been diverted pursuant to this chapter
within five years preceding the current charge; and
(7) the defendant has not been diverted more than once before. 214
(C) If a defendant satisfies the conditions listed above, the district at-
torney's office shall assess whether the defendant is likely to complete
the diversion program successfully.
(D) Discretion to admit the defendant to the diversion program may be
exercised if:
213 Id. at 18.
214 See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1000.6-.7 (West Supp. 1983).
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(1) the defendant demonstrates motivationi to stop battering; and
(2) other factors indicate the defendat would benefit from
counseling.
215
(E) Discretion to pursue prosecution may be exercised if:
(1) the injury inflicted upon the victim is severe;
(2) the victim indicates an extensive history of previous incidents of
domestic violence by the defendant; or
(3) the defendant has a significant criminal record.
(F) No admission of guilt shall be required as a condition of eligibility
for diversion.
216
COMMENTARY: The eligibility requirements create a screening
mechanism that will prevent diversion if the defendant or the
victim does not consent or if the defendant's criminal record
makes it likely that he would use diversion to avoid incarcera-
tion and would not participate seriously in the program. The
eligibility criteria in subsection (B) are m.ndatory; a defendant
who fails to satisfy any of the listed requirements may not be
admitted to the program. The criteria in subsections (D) and
(E), however, are intended to guide the prosecutor's discretion
in determining who should be admitted to ':he diversion program.
6.03. Notice Requirements.
(A) If the district attorney concludes that the defendant is eligible for
diversion, he or she shall notify the defendant's attorney (or the
defendant) and the victim. Notice shall be given orally and in writing
and shall include:
(1) a description of the purposes and procedures of the diversion
program;
(2) a general explanation of the roles and activities of the court, the
prosecuting attorney, and the counseling program in the diver-
sion process and an explanation of the scope of the prosecutor's
discretion in determining which defendants are eligible for
diversion;
(3) notice that the court, at a hearing, may decide not to divert the
defendant;
(4) a clear statement of the conditions of diversion; and
215 Cf. id. §§ 1000.6, 1000.8(a) (West Supp. 1983) (providing for the court to determine
the eligibility of the defendant for diversion based on similar factors).
216 See id. § 1000.6(c) (West Supp. 1983).
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(5) notice of the penalty for failing to meet the conditions of
diversion.
217
(B) If the prosecuting attorney decides that the defendant is ineligible
for diversion, the district attorney shall file a written statement with
the court of the grounds upon which the determination is based and
shall make copies of this statement available to the defendant, the
victim, and the defendant's attorney. 218
COMMENTARY: No comment.
6.04. Consent. A defendant found eligible for diversion shall have an
opportunity to consult with an attorney before entering into a diversion
agreement. If the defendant agrees to participate in diversion, the de-
fendant shall sign a written agreement under which he or she shall
consent to the following terms:
(A) that he or she will abide by the conditions of diversion, including
the restrictions imposed by the protection order, for a specified
period;
(B) that he or she waives the right to a speedy trial; and
(C) that the agreement will toll any applicable civil or criminal statutes
of limitation during the period of diversion. 2 9 The agreement shall
also be signed by the victim and by the district attorney or by his
or her designee.
COMMENTARY: The notice and consent requirements would
prevent diversion in any case in which the defendant was not
fully aware of the conditions of diversion. Absent such elaborate
notice, the defendant might view the conditions imposed as
punishment without conviction, especially since a post-convic-
tion sentence might be similar to the terms of diversion. 220
6.05. Admissions Procedure.
(A) Defendants shall be screened for diversion and eligible defendants
shall be admitted to the program whenever possible within forty-
eight hours after criminal charges are filed, or after the prosecutor
identifies an abuse case.
(B) When a defendant is found eligible for and has consented to partic-
ipation in diversion, the district attorney shall move for a continu-
ance of the charges pending the defendant's completion of the div-
ersion program. The district attorney shall request approval of a
217 See id. § 1000.7(a) (West Supp. 1983).
21" See id. § 1000.6(b) (West Supp. 1983).
219 See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 971.37(m) (West Supp. 1982).
220 See L. LERMAN, supra note 4, at 47-50.
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consent agreement listing the terms of the diversion pursuant to
section 6.06, and shall file a petition for a protection order on behalf
of the victim. Whenever possible, such motion for continuance shall
be made at a bond hearing or at arraignment, but may be made at
any stage of the prosecution prior to sentencing.
(C) In ruling on the motion, the court shall determine whether the
defendant knowingly has consented to participate and may review
the factors used in determining eligibility.
(D) If the motion for continuance is granted, the court shall issue an
order for diversion of the defendant which incorporates the terms
of the consent agreement.
(E) If the court orders that the defendant be diverted and finds that the
defendant is able to pay all or part of the costs of counseling, the
court may order the defendant to pay this cost. If the defendant is
indigent, the court may order the county to pay for counseling or
may refer the defendant to a program that provides counseling
services without charge.
(F) If the court decides that the defendant should not be diverted, the
proceedings shall continue as if no attempt to divert the defendant
had been made.
2 21
COMMENTARY: The procedures for admission are designed to
ensure the defendant's diversion as soon as possible after
charges are filed. The effectiveness of diversion may be related
to the amount of time that elapses between the filing of charges
and the defendant's entry into the diversion program.222 The
trauma that abusers often experience immediately after an in-
cident of abuse makes immediate action critical. If days or
weeks pass, the program may not be effective.2 23
6.06. Conditions of Diversion.
(A) Prosecution of criminal charges against a defendant may be deferred
for the purposes of diverting the defendant pursuant to this chapter
for not less than six months (unless the defendant violates the terms
of diversion) nor longer than two years. 224
(B) The terms and conditions of diversion shall be designed on an in-
dividual basis to provide for the protection of the victim and other
designated persons and to provide for the rehabilitation of the de-
22 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.8(a) (West Supp. 1983).
222 L. LERMAN, supra note 4, at 94-95.
221 See id. at 110-11.
24 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.8(c) (West Supp. 1983).
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fendant through treatment and prohibition of any conduct that could
lead to violence.
225
(C) Conditions of diversion shall include an order of counseling that is
designed to stop the defendant's violent behavior and an order of
protection for the victim that may include any of the relief available
under section 4.05.
(D) In referring defendants to counseling, preference shall be given to
programs or therapists who focus on terminating violent behavior
through group counseling or who teach defendants skills for resolv-
ing conflict without using violence. The court shall not refer defen-
dants to couples counseling or to family therapy with their victims.
COMMENTARY: The section on conditions of diversion contem-
plates that each participant in the program would make an in-
dividual contract with the staff of the program, specifying the
terms of his participation. The defendant must agree to partici-
pate in an intensive program of counseling for at least six
months. He must also agree to comply with the terms of a
protection order and to refrain from violence during
participation.
Some therapists consider six months of counseling to be the
minimum amount of time necessary for counseling to have any
lasting impact on an established pattern of violence.22 6 Special-
ized programs are preferred to family therapy because these
programs make use of new techniques for working with batterers
and stopping violent behavior. The statute also encourages the
use of group counseling for batterers. One therapist experienced
in this area of mental health has determined that an abuser must
address his problem in a group or individual setting before en-
gaging in counseling with other members of his family.
2 27
6.07. Discretion to Terminate.
(A) The district attorney or the administrator of the counseling program
shall contact the victim at least monthly during the period of div-
ersion so that the victim has an opportunity to report any violations
of the diversion agreement by the defendant.
(B) If the prosecuting attorney or the court receives information from
a counselor, the victim, or another source that the defendant has
22I ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601(G) (West Supp. 1983).
226 L. LERMAN, supra note 4, at 103.
227 See generally A. GANLEY, supra note 71, at 68-70. A list of counseling programs
that conduct group therapy for men who batter is available from the Center for Women
Policy Studies, 2000 P St., N.W., Suite 508, Washington, D.C. 20036.
[Vol. 21:61
Domestic Abuse
violated a condition of diversion or is not benefiting from counseling,
or if the defendant is convicted of any offense involving violence as
prohibited by section 6.02, the district attorney may terminate div-
ersion. Upon termination of diversion, the district attorney shall
reinstitute criminal proceedings against the defendant; if the defen-
dant is participating in post-conviction diversion, the court may
proceed to sentence the defendant.
228
(C) In cases in which diversion is terminated and prosecution resumed,
charges may not be dismissed at the request of the victim absent
unusual circumstances. Unusual circumstances might be found if
failure to dismiss charges would increase the risk of harm to the
victim and if law enforcement officials would be unable to protect
the victim during prosecution.
COMMENTARY: The statute requires the prosecution of the de-
fendant to be resumed if the defendant violates the terms of
diversion and the district attorney decides to terminate the pro-
gram. The statute also prohibits dismissal of charges at the
victim's request in most cases. This prevents the defendant from
avoiding the terms of diversion by persuading or coercing the
victim to request dismissal of charges. The "unusual circum-
stances" exception is included because in some cases failure to
dismiss charges may place the victim in great danger. If the law
enforcement system is unable to protect the victim during pros-
ecution, it must not compel her participation.
6.08. Successful Completion of the Diversion Program.
(A) On fulfillment of the terms and conditions of diversion, the court
shall discharge the defendant and dismiss the proceedings. Discharge
and dismissal under this section shall be without adjudication of
guilt and is not a conviction of a crime.
229
(B) Two years after the discharge and dismissal under this section the
defendant's record of arrest or criminal charges may be expunged
upon request, provided there has been no further arrest or convic-
tion for any offense involving a violent act.2 30
(C) When a defendant's record is expunged, the police department shall
retain a nonpublic record of charges discharged or dismissed under
this section. This record shall be furnished to a court, police agency,
an attorney for a victim of domestic abuse, or prosecutor's office
upon request to show that a defendant in a civil or criminal action
228 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.9 (West Supp. 1983).
229 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.4a(3) (1979).
230 Cf. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.10 (West Supp. 1983) (providing for the expungement
of arrest record upon the successful completion of a diversion program).
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involving domestic violence previously completed the diversion
program.
23'
COMMENTARY: This section provides for the expungement of
records because avoidance of a criminal record is frequently a
strong incentive for active participation in a diversion program.
The statute requires that a private record be kept that will be
available to law enforcement officials and attorneys handling
subsequent domestic violence by the same individual.
6.09. Data Collection on Diversion of Criminal Defendants in Abuse
Cases.
The prosecutor's office or the prosecutor's designee shall collect and
retain the following data:
(A) the number of cases screened for diversion;
(B) the number of cases accepted into the diversion program;
(C) a breakdown of the criminal charges that had been filed against
defendants accepted into the program;
(D) conditions imposed on diverted defendants;
(E) the number of successful completions;
(F) the number of unsuccessful terminations;
(G) the reasons for unsuccessful termination;
(H) the duration of defendants' participation in the diversion program;
and
(I) the disposition of criminal charges and sentences imposed on defen-
dants rejected and on defendants unsuccessfully terminated.
COMMENTARY: The data collection provision is necessary in
order to monitor the operation of the diversion program. Some
programs have been very successful .and have used the data
collected in seeking funding for continued operation.
23 2
6.10. Evidence.
(A) Consent to participate in diversion is not an admission of guilt and
the consent may not be admitted in evidence in a trial except to
rebut allegations that the statute of limitations has run or that the
defendant's right to a speedy trial has been denied.
233
2" See MIcH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 769.4a(4) (West 1982).
232 See, e.g., L. LERMAN, supra note 4, at 157-60 app. (reprinting data from the
annual reports of the Miami Domestic Intervention Program).
233 See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 971.37(4) (West Supp. 1982).
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(B) Communications between defendants, diversion program staff, and
therapists who provide counseling for defendants, as well as com-
munications between victims and advocacy staff, therapists, or oth-
ers who assist victims in obtaining protection, shall be confidential,
except that the court or the prosecutor may review information
concerning violation of the terms of diversion. Statements made
during diversion and records kept by the program shall be inad-
missible in any court proceeding.
COMMENTARY: Because participation in diversion is not an ad-
mission of guilt, information obtained about the defendant's
conduct during diversion should not be available in any prose-
cution. If the defendant is expected to be honest about his own
violence, he must trust the confidentiality of a relationship with
a therapist or other staff member with whom he has contact
during diversion. The statute protects the confidential records
created during diversion by prohibiting their use in court
proceedings.

